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Abstract
The paper studies dynamic information flow security policies in an
automaton-based model. Two semantic interpretations of such policies
are developed, both of which generalize the notion of TA-security [van
der Meyden ESORICS 2007] for static intransitive noninterference poli-
cies. One of the interpretations focuses on information flows permitted
by policy edges, the other focuses on prohibitions implied by absence of
policy edges. In general, the two interpretations differ, but necessary
and sufficient conditions are identified for the two interpretations to be
equivalent. Sound and complete proof techniques are developed for both
interpretations. Two applications of the theory are presented. The first
is a general result showing that access control mechanisms are able to en-
force a dynamic information flow policy. The second is a simple capability
system motivated by the Flume operating system.
1 Introduction
Covert channels, i.e., avenues for information flow unintended by the designers
of a system, present a significant risk for systems that are required to enforce
confidentiality, since they constitute vulnerabilities that an attacker may exploit
in order to exfiltrate secrets. This has motivated a body of research that aims to
provide means by which systems can be assured to be free of covert channels. At
the highest levels of assurance, one aims for formal verification based on rigorous
models of the system. This requires formal definitions of what it means for a
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system to comply with a policy that specifies the intended information flows,
and prohibits the unintended information flows.
How to give a formal semantics to such policies that is suitable for formal
verification has been a topic of study since the 1970’s [10]. Noninterference poli-
cies [15] are a form of policy syntax in the form of a graph over a set of security
levels, or domains, with an edge representing that information is permitted to
flow from the source of the edge to the destination. Conversely, absence of an
edge can be understood as prohibiting (direct) information flow. In the origi-
nal formulation of such policies, corresponding to classical multi-level security
policies based on a lattice of security levels, the graph was transitive, but there
has more recently been a body of work on intransitive noninterference policies,
which do not require transitivity. Here, a domain is best understood as a com-
ponent within a security architecture, with edges describing permitted direct
flows of information, and paths corresponding to permitted indirect flows of in-
formation. In particular, this understanding underlies MILS security [2, 36], an
approach to high assurance systems development in which security architectures
comprised of trusted and untrusted components are enforced using a variety of
mechanisms including separation kernels. At its most abstract level, the ar-
chitecture can be understood as an intransitive noninterference policy. Several
large-scale efforts [6, 19, 24, 27, 31] have formally verified that intransitive non-
interference policies hold in a number of separation kernels.
The proper semantics of intransitive noninterference policies has proved to
be a subtle matter. Rushby [30] improved an initial proposal by Haigh and
Young [17], giving semantics to policies by means of an intransitive purge func-
tion. Van der Meyden [34] has recently argued that there is a subtle weakness
in this intransitive purge based semantics. He provides an example that demon-
strates that this semantics may classify as secure a system that contains flows
of information, based on the ordering of events, that seem to contradict an
intuitive understanding of the policy. He proposes an alternative, stronger, def-
inition of security, TA-security, that correctly classifies this example as insecure.
Moreover, TA-security is shown to provide a better fit for Rushby’s proof the-
ory. Rushby shows that this proof theory is sound for his definition, but fails to
provide a completeness result. Van der Meyden explains this, by showing that
it is both sound and complete for the stronger notion of TA-security. This com-
pleteness result is obtained both for Rushby’s unwinding proof method and for
a variant of Rushby’s results demonstrating that access control systems provide
a sound method for enforcement of intransitive noninterference policies.
This line of work has concerned static policies, in which the permitted flows
of information do not change over time. Such policies are too restrictive for
many practical purposes: the permitted flows of information in a system could
change as a result of policy changes, system reconfiguration, in response to de-
tection of vulnerabilities or attacks in progress, as a result of personnel changes,
promotions, revocations of privileges, delegations, transfers of capabilities, and
for many other reasons.
A full understanding of the formal underpinnings of security architecture
should accommodate such dynamic policy changes, and it is therefore of inter-
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est to have a satisfactory theory of dynamic intransitive noninterference policies.
To date, only a few works have studied this question: Leslie [22] and Eggert
et. al. [11]. Both are based on generalizations of Rushby’s “intransitive purge”
operator and, in the case of static policies, are equivalent to Rushby’s seman-
tics. Consequently, these works are subject to the weakness of this semantics
identified by van der Meyden. In particular, they misclassify van der Meyden’s
example. Leslie provides an unwinding proof theory for her definition that is
equivalent to Rushby’s unwinding in the static case, hence is incomplete. Eggert
et. al. do provide a complete proof theory and a complexity characterization
for their definition.
Our main contribution in this paper is to develop alternate semantics for
dynamic intransitive noninterference policies that generalize the more adequate
notion of TA-security in the static case. Indeed, we show (in Section 3) that
there are several candidates for such a semantics since, in the dynamic setting, it
turns out that the information flows permitted by policy edges are not always the
complement of the information flows prohibited by the absence of policy edges.
This leads to two distinct semantics, one of which prioritizes the permissions and
the other of which prioritizes the prohibitions. A further complexity to policy in
the dynamic setting is the question of what knowledge the agents in the system
are permitted to have of the state of the policy itself. However, this consideration
is also helpful: we show that locality, a natural condition on agent knowledge of
the policy, provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the permissive and
the prohibitive interpretations of the policy to be equivalent. Reference to agent
knowledge also enables us to characterize precisely the maximal information
permitted to be known to each agent in the system at moment of time, in terms
of a concrete representation of the information that may have been transmitted
to the agent. We show by some examples that our definitions improve on those
of Leslie [22] and Eggert et. al. [11], not just in the treatment of static policies
(van der Meyden’s example justifying TA-security), but also in the classification
of some simple dynamic policies.
We then (in Section 4) develop proof methods that may be used to show
that a system is secure, with a focus on local policies, so that the technique
applies to both of our definitions of security. We first generalize the classical
unwinding proof method [16] to our new definitions. This is used (in Section 5)
to generalize, to a dynamic setting, Rushby’s [30] results on enforcement of a
static intransitive noninterference policy by means of access control settings.
In both cases, we demonstrate not just soundness but also completeness of the
proof method.
As an application of the theory, we establish (in Section 6) security for a
capability system, motivated by the Flume operating system [21]. We show
that the capability system enforces a naturally associated dynamic intransitive
noninterference policy. This result gives an illustration of how the general theory
can be applied to a concrete system.
3
2 Basic Definitions
In this section we give the basic definitions concerning the systems model about
which we will make security judgements, and introduce the syntax of dynamic
intransitive noninterference policies. The following section develops several se-
mantics for these policies in this systems model.
2.1 Systems
We model systems as deterministic automata in which the actions of multiple
agents cause state transitions. Agents obtain information about the state of
system, and each other’s actions, by making observations of the state of the
system.
A signature is a tuple 〈D, dom, A〉, where D is a finite set of domains, (which
we may also refer to as agents), A is a finite set of actions, and dom : A → D,
assigns each action to a domain (agent). Intuitively, dom(a) is the domain within
which the action a is performed (the agent performing that action). We write
A∗ for the set of finite sequences of elements of the set A and denote the empty
sequence by ǫ.
An automaton for a signature 〈D, dom, A〉 is a tuple 〈S, s0,→〉, where S is a
set of states (not necessarily finite), s0 ∈ S is the initial state, and→ ⊆ S×A×S
is a labelled transition relation. This relation is required to be input-enabled, in
the sense that for all states s ∈ S and actions a ∈ A, there exists t ∈ S such
that (s, a, t) ∈ →. We also assume that the relation is deterministic in the sense
that if (s, a, t) ∈ → and (s, a, t′) ∈ → then t = t′. Under these assumptions, we
may write s · a for the unique t such that (s, a, t) ∈ →.
We make several uses of the general notion of automaton. One is the ma-
chine model that we analyze for security. Formally, a system for a signature
〈D, dom, A〉 is an automaton 〈S, s0,→〉 for the signature, together with an ob-
servation function obs : D × S → O. Intuitively, obs(u, s) is the observation
made in domain u (by agent u) when the system is in state s. Since the
domain u will typically be fixed in a context of application, but the state
s will vary, we write obsu(s) for obs(u, s). We write systems in the form
M = 〈S, s0,→, D, dom, A, obs〉 when we wish to make all the relevant com-
ponents explicit.
The assumption that the transition relation is input-enabled has often been
made in the literature. It prevents enablement of actions being a source of
information flow, and intuitively represents that it is always possible for an
agent to attempt to perform an action (even if it would have no actual effect).
A situation s where an agent is not able to successfully perform an action can
be represented in an input-enabled model by means of a transition (s, a, s) that
leaves the state unchanged. If it is desired to model that the agent is able to
observe that the action is not enabled, this can be encoded in the observation
that the agent makes in either the source or destination state of the transition.
(This leaves the modelling of the way that enablement of actions becomes known
to agents in the hands of the system modeller, as opposed to many process
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algebraic semantics, e.g., those using bisimulation, that would mandate that
enablement of actions is always observable.)
The restriction to deterministic systems is made in part because the the-
ory of intransitive noninterference is better understood in deterministic systems
[30, 34] than in nondeterministic systems [13]. However, in many cases, non-
determinism can be represented in deterministic systems by using additional
agents to model the source of nondeterminism. (This does require that such
additional agents be included in the policy as well as in the systems model, but
that can be argued to add clarity to the meaning of the policy.)
A run of a system is a sequence s0a1s1 . . . ansn, where n ≥ 0 and the si ∈ S
are states (with s0 the initial state of the system) and the ai ∈ A are actions,
such that for i = 1 . . . n we have si = si−1 · a. We call the sequence α =
a1 . . . an ∈ A
∗ the trace of the run. Conversely, since the system is input-
enabled and deterministic, every sequence α ∈ A∗ is the trace of a unique run.
We may therefore refer to runs by their corresponding traces. For a sequence
α = a1 . . . an ∈ A∗ and a state s ∈ S, we write s · α for the state reached after
executing the sequence of actions α starting at s, i.e., the state tn, obtained
inductively by taking t0 = s and ti = ti−1 · ai, for i = 1 . . . n.
Two systems M = 〈S, so,→, obs〉 and M = 〈S′, s′0,→
′, obs′〉 for the same
signature 〈D, dom, A〉 are bisimilar if for all u ∈ D and α ∈ A∗, we have obsu(s0 ·
α) = obs′u(s
′
0 ·α). (We remark that we do not need the usual relational definition
of bisimilarity because our systems are deterministic.) It is easily checked that
all the definitions of security that follow are preserved under bisimilarity.
The unfolding of a system M for signature 〈D, dom, A〉 is defined to be the
system unfold(M) for the same signature, with states A∗, initial state ǫ, tran-
sition relation such that α · a = αa for all α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A, and observation
functions obsu(α) = obs
M
u (s0 · α). The system unfold(M) is easily seen to be
bisimilar toM , so unfold(M) can be thought of as an equivalent implementation
of the system M .
2.2 Static Policies
A static policy describes the permitted and prohibited flows of information be-
tween domains. Formally, a static policy for the signature 〈D, dom, A〉 is a
reflexive binary relation֌ (possibly intransitive) on the set of domains D. In-
tuitively, u֌ v means that information is permitted to flow from domain u to
domain v, and conversely, u 6֌ v means that information flows from domain u
to domain v are prohibited.
Policies are assumed to be reflexive because, intuitively, nothing can be
done to prevent information flowing from a domain to itself, so this is allowed
by default. Since ֌ can be taken to be the edge set of a directed graph with
vertex set D, we may use terminology from graph theory when we describe
properties of a policy. For example, we may call u֌ v an “edge” of the policy
֌, and talk about “paths” in the relation ֌.
We remark that the system model introduced above appears to lack a notion
of internal (silent) transitions, but these can be handled by adding a systems
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domain Sys, such that each internal transition corresponds to some action of
domain Sys. This representation also requires adding an edge Sys֌ u to the
policy for all other domains u.
A significant body of work already exists in relation to static policies, e.g.,
[15, 30, 34, 29]. Since our focus in this paper is to find semantics for dynamic
policies that generalizes the semantics of van der Meyden [34] for static intran-
sitive noninterference policies, we reiterate here just that semantics in order to
motivate what follows, and refer the reader to the literature for more detailed
discussion. The semantics involves for each agent u a function tau from the
set of traces, such that for a trace α, the value tau(α) intuitively represents a
concrete encoding of the maximal amount of information that the agent is per-
mitted to have about α. The function tau transforms a trace α into a binary
tree, which contains less information about the order of the actions than the
trace does. This function is defined inductively by1 tau(ǫ) = ǫ and for every
α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A by
tau(αa) =
{
(tau(α), tadom(a)(α), a) if dom(a)֌ u
tau(α) otherwise .
Intuitively, in case dom(a) 6֌ u, information from dom(a) is not permitted to
flow to u, so the occurrence of the action a causes no change in the maximal
information tau(α) that may be possessed by u after α. However, if dom(a)֌ u,
then the occurrence of a after α causes the maximal information that agent u
is permitted to have to increase, by adding to its prior information tau(α)
the maximal information tadom(a)(α) that the agent performing a is permitted
to have after α, as well as the fact that the action a has occurred. Using
the functions tau, we may now declare a system to be secure, in the sense of
complying with the information flow policy ֌, as follows:
Definition 1 A system M is TA-secure with respect to policy ֌, if for all
agents u and α, β ∈ A∗, if tau(α) = tau(β) then obsu(s0 · α) = obsu(s0 · β).
Intuitively, this says that for all agents u, the observation obsu(s0·α) contains
no more information than the maximal permitted information tau(α).
In general, when considering the deductive capabilities of agents in computer
security, it is appropriate to assume that an adversary will reason based not
just on their current observation, but also using their past observations. This
suggests that we should consider a perfect recall attacker. In the case of TA-
security, a definition stated using a perfect recall attacker is equivalent to one
stated using just the final observation of traces [34]. We formulate this result
in a more general way, so that it also applies to the other definitions we state
in this paper.
1 Note that the functions tau depend on the policy ֌, but to avoid clutter, this is sup-
pressed in the notation, here and for similar definitions later in the paper. We may add the
policy to the notation in contexts containing several policies, e.g., by writing ta֌
u
(α) when
the policy used is ֌.
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First, to capture a perfect recall attacker, we define the view of an agent u
inductively, by viewu(ǫ) = obsu(s0) and
viewu(αa) =
{
viewu(α) a obsu(s0 · αa) if dom(a) = u
viewu(α) ◦ obsu(s0 · αa) otherwise
where every α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A. Here, σ◦x denotes the absorptive concatenation
of an element x of a set X to a string whose final element is in X , defined by
ǫx = x, and σy ◦ x = σyx if x 6= y and σy ◦ x = σy if y = x. The reason
we apply this type of concatenation is to capture the asynchronous behaviour
of the system, where agents do not necessarily have access to a global clock.
Intuitively, agent u is aware of its own actions, so these are always available
in its perfect recall view. This is captured by the first clause of the definition
of viewu. However, when another agent performs an action, this may or may
not cause a change in u’s observation. If it does, then u detects the change,
and the new observation is added to its view. However, if there is no change
of observation, then there is no change to the view, since the agent is assumed
to operate asynchronously, so that it does not know for what length of time it
makes each observation.
Consider an indexed collection of functions f = {fu}u∈D, each with domain
A∗, and defined by fu(ǫ) = ǫ and
fu(αa) =
{
(fu(α), g(α, a, u)) if C(α, a, u)
fu(α) otherwise
for some boolean condition C and function g, where α ∈ A∗, a ∈ A and u ∈ D.
Note that the collection ta is in this pattern, with g(α, a, u) = (fdom(a)(α), a)
and C(α, a, u) = dom(a)֌ u. We say that f is self-aware if dom(a) = u implies
C(α, a, u), and g(α, a, u) = g(β, b, u) implies a = b. Intuitively, in the self-aware
case, fu(α) encodes at least a record of all the actions of domain u that occur
in α.
Say that a system is f -secure if for all α, β ∈ A∗ with fu(α) = fu(β),
we have obsu(s0 · α) = obsu(s0 · β). An alternative definition with the view
function instead of obs is: a system is f -view-secure if for all α, β ∈ A∗ with
fu(α) = fu(β), we have viewu(α) = viewu(β). These definitions are equivalent,
subject to self-awareness of f :
Lemma 1 Suppose that f is self-aware. Then a system M is f -secure iff it is
f -view-secure.
Proof: Assume first that M is not f -view-secure. Then there are u ∈ D and
α, β ∈ A∗ of minimal combined length with fu(α) = fu(β) and viewu(α) 6=
viewu(β). At least one of α and β is not the empty trace, suppose that it is α
and let α = α′a for some α′ ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A. Then there are two cases:
• Case 1: fu(α
′a) = fu(α
′). Then fu(α
′) = fu(β), so from the minimality
of α and β it follows that viewu(α
′) = viewu(β) and hence viewu(α
′) 6=
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viewu(α
′a). Since C(α, a, u) is false, we have by self-awareness that
dom(a) 6= u, so viewu(α′a) = viewu(α′)obsu(s0 · α′a). Therefore, we
have obsu(s0 · α′a) 6= obsu(s0 · β).
• Case 2: fu(α′a) 6= fu(α′). We can assume that β = β′b for some β′ ∈ A∗
and b ∈ A with fu(β′b) 6= fu(β′) since otherwise, we proceed with the first
case with the roles of α and β swapped. From the inductive definition
of fu and self-awareness, it follows that a = b and fu(α
′) = fu(β
′). By
the minimality of α and β, we have viewu(α
′) = viewu(β
′). There are
two cases of the definitions of viewu(α
′a) and viewu(β
′a), depending on
whether dom(a) = u, but in either case, it follows that obsu(s0 · α′a) 6=
obsu(s0 · β′b), since the only difference in these sequences can be in the
final observation.
The other direction of the proof follows directly from the definition of the view
function. 
Since the definition of f = ta is easily seen to be self-aware (using reflexivity
of the policy), it follows from Lemma 1 that TA-security and ta-view-security
are equivalent.
2.3 Dynamic Policies
Our main concern in this paper is with dynamic intransitive information flow
policies, which generalize static policies by allowing the edges of the policy
to depend on the actions that have been performed in the system. Formally,
a dynamic policy is a relation ֌ ⊆ D ×A∗ ×D, such that (u, α, u) ∈ ֌
for all α ∈ A∗ and all u ∈ D. We write α |= u ֌ v when (u, α, v) ∈ ֌.
Intuitively, α |= u֌ v says that, after the sequence of actions α have been
performed, information may flow from domain u to domain v. Thus, ֌α=
{(u, v) | (u, α, v) ∈ ֌} is the (static) policy that applies after the actions α
have been performed.
Dynamic policies can be represented using automata. We say that a tuple
〈P,֌′〉 consisting of an automaton P = 〈S, s0,→〉 and a relation֌′ ⊆ D×S×
D represents a dynamic policy֌, if for all α ∈ A∗, domains u, v,∈ D, and state
s ∈ S with s = s0 ·α, we have α |= u֌ v iff (u, s, v) ∈֌′. (In this case we also
write s |= u֌′ v.) Every dynamic policy has such a representation (with an
infinite number of states), since we may take S = A∗ and → = {(α, a, αa) | α ∈
A∗, a ∈ A}. We may call the policy finite state if it has a representation with S
finite.
Let 〈D, dom, A〉 be a signature. A policy enhanced system for this signature is
an automaton A = 〈S, s0,→〉 that is equipped with a relation֌ ⊆ D × S ×D
and an observation function obs with domain D × S. Given a system M and
a dynamic policy ֌′ for the signature, we say that the policy enhanced sys-
tem 〈A,֌, obs〉 encodes M and ֌′ if 〈A, obs〉 is bisimilar to M and 〈A,֌〉
represents֌′.
For every pair consisting of a systemM and a dynamic policy֌ for the same
signature, we can construct a policy enhanced system that encodes M and ֌.
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Given an automaton representation 〈AP ,֌′〉 of ֌ where AP = 〈SP , sP0 ,→
P
〉, and a system M = 〈AM , obs
M 〉 where AM = 〈SM , sM0 ,→
M 〉 for the same
signature, we define the product automaton AM × AP = 〈S, s0,→〉, where
S = SM × SP , s0 = (sM0 , s
P
0 ) and ((s, p), a, (s
′, p′)) ∈ → iff (s, a, s′) ∈ →M and
(p, a, p′) ∈ →P . The automaton AM×AP may be equipped with an observation
function obs with domain S and a policy relation֌′′ ⊆ D×S×D by defining
obs(u, (s, p)) = obsM (u, s) and ֌′′ = {(u, (s, p), v) | u ֌p v}. It is then
straightforward to show that the policy enhanced system 〈AM ×AP , obs,֌′′〉
encodes M and ֌.
It will often be convenient, in presenting examples, to use a diagram of a
policy enhanced system in order to present the policy and the system together
as a single automaton. Figure 1 gives an example of this presentation. We note
the following conventions to be applied in interpreting these diagrams. The
systems represented are input-enabled, but we elide self loops corresponding
to edges of the form (s, a, s) in order to reduce clutter. States are partitioned
into three components. The top component gives the name of the state. The
middle component depicts the static policy applicable at that state. The bottom
component gives partial information about the observations that the agents
make at the state: typically, only one agent’s information is relevant to the
discussion, and we elide the observations of the other agents in the system.
There is a natural order on policies. Consider the binary relation ≤ on poli-
cies with respect to a given signature 〈D, dom, A〉, defined by֌ ≤֌′ iff for all
α ∈ A∗ and u, v ∈ D, we have α |= u֌ v implies α |= u֌′ v. It is easily seen
that this relation partially orders the policies with respect to the signature. In-
tuitively, if֌ ≤֌′ then֌ places more restrictions on the flow of information
in a system than does ֌′. This intuition can be supported for both a permis-
sive and a prohibitive reading of policies. On a permissive reading, ֌ ≤ ֌′
intuitively says that every situation in which a flow of information is explicitly
permitted by ֌ is one where the flow of information is explicitly permitted by
֌′. Thus, ֌ is more restrictive than ֌′ in the sense of having fewer explic-
itly permitted flows of information. On a prohibitive reading, ֌ ≤ ֌′ says
(contrapositively) that every situation where ֌′ explicitly prohibits a flow of
information is one where ֌ also explicitly prohibits that flow of information.
Thus,֌ is more restrictive than֌′ in the sense of having more explicitly pro-
hibited flows of information. We may therefore gloss ֌ ≤ ֌′ as stating that
֌ is more restrictive than ֌′.
2.4 Logic of Knowledge
It will be convenient to formulate some of our definitions using formulas from
a logic of knowledge. Given a signature 〈D, dom, A〉, we work with formulas φ
expressed using the following grammar:
φ ::= u֌ v | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | Kuφ | DGφ
where u, v ∈ D are domains and G ⊆ D is a set of domains. Intuitively, the
atomic propositions of the logic are assertions of the form u ֌ v concerning
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the static policy holding at a particular point of time. We write Prop for the
set of atomic propositions. The logic contains the usual boolean operators for
conjunction and negation, and we freely use other boolean operators that can
be defined using these, e.g., we write φ ⇒ ψ for ¬(φ ∧ ¬ψ). The formula Kuφ
intuitively says that domain u knows that φ holds, and DGφ says that it is
distributed knowledge to the group G that φ holds, i.e., the group G would be
able to deduce φ if they were to pool all the information held by the members
of the group.
The semantics of the logic is a standard Kripke semantics for epistemic logic
[14]: formulas are interpreted in Kripke structures K = 〈W, {∼u}u∈D, |=〉 where
W is a set, for each u ∈ D, we have an equivalence relation ∼u on W , and
|= ⊆W × Prop is a binary relation.
Intuitively, W is a set of worlds, representing possible situations in a system
of interest. The equivalence relation ∼u intuitively corresponds to indistin-
guishability of worlds to an agent: w ∼u w′ will hold when agent u has the
same information available to it when it is in situation w as it has in situation
w′. For a world w and an atomic proposition p, the relation w |= p represents
that the proposition p is true at the world w. We may also write this as K, w |= p
to make the structure K explicit. In turn, this relation can be extended to a
satisfaction relation K, w |= φ for arbitrary formulas, by means of the following
recursion:
K, w |= φ1 ∧ φ2 if K, w |= φ1 and K, w |= φ2
K, w |= ¬φ if not K, w |= φ1
K, w |= Kuφ if K, w′ |= φ for all w′ ∈W with w ∼u w′
K, w |= DGφ if K, w′ |= φ for all w′ ∈W with w ∼u w′
for all u ∈ G
In our applications, we will work with the set of worlds W = A∗, i.e., worlds
will be traces for the signature of interest. The basic relation w |= p will be the
relation α |= u֌ v from some dynamic policy for this signature. We discuss
the equivalence relations we use later.
3 Semantics for dynamic policies
In the setting of dynamic policies, several subtle issues arise that a suitable
definition of security needs to take into account.
One is that policies can be interpreted with a focus on positive or negative
edges. One can read α |= u֌ v as stating a permission: in state α, actions of u
may pass information from u to v (even if u or v does not know that α |= u֌ v).
Nothing about the policy or system may override this permission, and an agent
cannot be sanctioned for having caused the information flow. Alternately, and
more restrictively, one could focus on the converse: and treat α |= u 6֌ v as
stating a prohibition: in state α, information may not flow from u to v. The
interaction between various such prohibitions may have the effect that even
where there is an edge α |= u֌ v, it is in fact prohibited for information to
10
s0
P A
B
obsB : 0
s1
P A
B
obsB : 0
s2
P A
B
obsB : 1
p a
Figure 1: Conflicting permissive and prohibitive interpretations
flow from u to v because of derived prohibitions. The following example suggests
that these two readings of the policy may be in conflict.
Example 1: Consider the system in Figure 1. Intuitively, domain P is a
policy authority that controls the policy between domains A and B by means
of its action p, and a is an action of domain A.
This system displays a conflict in the transition from state s1 to state s2,
between the permissive reading of the edge A֌ B and the prohibitive reading
of the edge P 6֌ B. On the one hand, according to a permissive reading of the
policy, the fact that the action a causes a change in the observation in domain B
is not an insecurity, because the policy explicitly permits a flow of information
from domain A to B in state s1, and what B learns in state s2 is that A has
performed action a. On the other hand, in no state of the policy is there an edge
from domain P to domain B. Even the union of all possible policy states does
not contain a path from P to B. Thus, we expect from a prohibitive reading
of the policy that there should be no flow of information from domain P to
domain B. On this reading, the transition from s1 to s2 displays an insecurity
in the system, since on making observation 1 domain B can deduce not just
that action a has occurred, but also that it has been preceded by action p in
domain P . Thus, the system contains a prohibited flow of information from P
to B, and should be judged to be insecure. 
There are several attitudes one can take in the face of such apparent con-
flicts within a policy. One is to allow explicit permissions to take precedence
over prohibitions. Another is to require that prohibitions take precedence over
permissions. Finally, we can restrict policies to instances that do not contain
such conflicts. We will consider all these possibilities.
For static policies, it is safe to assume that the policy is known to all agents
in the system: indeed, it can be assumed to be common knowledge. A second
subtlety for dynamic policies is that the current policy state depends on past
actions, and not all agents will be permitted to know the entire past. This
implies that there may be situations where some agents do not have complete
information about the current policy state. This causes difficulty for any agent
that is required to enforce compliance with the policy. For example, in the policy
of Example 1, agent A is never permitted to know whether P has performed
action p, so cannot be relied upon to enforce a policy restriction on the transfer
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of information about its actions to agent B, as applies in the initial policy state,
but not in state s1. We will approach this issue below by interpreting the policy
in a way takes into account what agents know about the policy state.
3.1 Permissive Interpretation
We first formulate a definition that captures a permissive reading of a dynamic
policy, while generalizing TA-security. The methodology underlying the notion
of TA-security is to construct a concrete representation of the maximal infor-
mation that each agent is permitted to have after each sequence of actions, and
then to state that a system is secure if it has no more than that permitted
information. For dynamic policies, with a permissive interpretation of edges
α |= u֌ v, this leads to the following inductive definition of an operator ta♦.
It is defined for every domain u, trace α ∈ A∗ and action a ∈ A by ta♦u(ǫ) = ǫ
and
ta♦u (αa) =
{
(ta♦u (α), ta
♦
dom(a)(α), a) if α |= dom(a)֌ u
ta♦u (α) otherwise .
We also obtain a derived equivalence relation ∼♦u on A
∗ for each u ∈ D, defined
by α ∼♦u β iff ta
♦
u (α) = ta
♦
u (β).
Intuitively, α |= dom(a) ֌ u states that it is permitted, after trace α, for
dom(a) to send information to u, and dom(a) exercises this by sending to u all
the information that it has (viz. ta♦
dom(a)(α)), as well as the fact that it is
performing the action a. The agent u receives this information and appends it
to the information that it already has (viz., ta♦u(α).) In case α |= dom(a) 6֌ u,
on the other hand, there is no transfer of information from dom(a) to u, since
the policy does not permit this.
If we take ta♦ as a formalization of the maximal information permitted to
an agent, we get the following definition of security, in the same pattern as
TA-security.
Definition 2 A system M is ta♦-secure with respect to a policy ֌ if for all
domains u and sequences of actions α, β, if ta♦u (α) = ta
♦
u (β) then obsu(s0 ·α) =
obsu(s0 · β).
We remark that the definition of ta♦ is self-aware (since by reflexivity
dom(a) = u implies α |= dom(a)֌ u for all α) so it follows from Lemma 1
that ta♦-security and ta♦-view-security are equivalent.
The following example shows that ta♦-security takes a permissive interpre-
tation of Example 1.
Example 2: Treating the diagram of Figure 1 as a definition of the policy, we
obtain that for any sequence α of the form a∗ or a∗p, we have ta♦B(α) = ǫ. On the
other hand ta♦B(pa) = (ǫ, ǫ, a), so every sequence β such that ta
♦
B(pa) = ta
♦
B(β)
has the property that it contains a p followed later by an a. Thus, if we interpret
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ta
♦
B(pa) as a concrete representation of what B is allowed to know after the
sequence pa, we conclude that B is permitted to know that there has been an
occurrence of action p. Indeed, for any sequence β with ta♦B(pa) = ta
♦
B(β) we
have s0 ·β = s2 = s0 · pa, so there is not a witness to insecurity of the system at
the sequence pa. The reader may confirm that this system is in fact ta♦-secure.
We remark here that we have ta♦A(p) = ǫ = ta
♦
A(ǫ) and ta
♦
B(p) = ǫ = ta
♦
B(ǫ),
but ta♦B(pa) = (ǫ, ǫ, a) 6= ǫ = ta
♦
B(a). That is, in general, the value ta
♦
B(αa)
depends on more than the values ta♦B(α) and ta
♦
A(α) and the action a; ad-
ditional information (namely, does α |= dom(a)֌ u hold) about the sequence
α is required to determine ta♦B(αa). We discuss the significance of this below. 
3.2 Prohibitive Interpretation
Example 2 shows that if we would like instead to prioritize prohibitions over
permissions when interpreting a policy, we need a different representation of the
maximal information permitted to an agent than that provided by the function
ta♦. It is not completely obvious what should be the deduced prohibitions that
prevent the use of an edge α |= dom(a)֌ u as a justification for the transmission
of information from dom(a) to u in the transition from state α to state αa.
However, we may apply some general constraints to suggest a definition.
First of all, note that for static policies, the function ta has the property that
the information available to domain u immediately after an action a performed
by domain dom(a), should depend only on the action a and the information pos-
sessed by domains u and dom(a). The function ta♦ does not have this property:
see the remark at the end of Example 2.
A general way to ensure that the state of information of domain u after action
a depends only on the prior states of information of domains u and dom(a), is
to condition the definition of the maximal information permitted to be known
to u on the distributed knowledge of the group {u, dom(a)}. This suggests
the following inductive definition of a function ta, similar to ta, defined by
tau (ǫ) = ǫ and if α |= D{dom(a),u}(dom(a)֌ u), then
tau (αa) = (ta

u (α), ta

dom(a)(α), a)
and else tau (αa) = ta

u (α).
The formula D{dom(a),u}(dom(a) ֌ u) ⇒ dom(a)֌ u is a validity of epis-
temic logic, so this definition strengthens the condition under which informa-
tion is transmitted in the definition of ta♦. Intuitively, this definition permits
transmission of dom(a)’s information to u only when it is distributed knowledge
to u and dom(a) that dom(a) ֌ u, i.e., there is not the possibility, so far as
these domains jointly know, that there is an edge dom(a) 6֌ u that prohibits
the transmission of information from dom(a) to u. Thus, the definition takes the
point of view that transmission is permitted whenever the agents would jointly
be able to confirm that there is not an explicit prohibition to the transmission.
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As it stands, the definition of ta is incomplete, because in order to interpret
the condition α |= D{dom(a),u}(dom(a) ֌ u), we need an appropriate Kripke
structure in order to evaluate the distributed knowledge operator. We may take
A∗ to be the set of worlds of this structure, and derive satisfaction of atomic
propositions from the policy, but it remains to specify equivalence relations ∼v
for v ∈ D. Intuitively, an equivalence α ∼v β holds when agent v is not able to
distinguish between the traces α and β: whenever the system is in state α, agent
v considers it possible that the system is in state β. What these equivalence
relations should be is not immediately apparent. We take the approach of
identifying some constraints on these equivalence relations.
First, consider the general constraint, that the way agent u’s state of infor-
mation is updated when action a is performed, should depend only on the prior
state of information of u and dom(a). This can be captured at the level of the
relations ∼v by means of the following constraint:
(WSC) For all traces α, β, and actions a, if α ∼u β and α ∼dom(a) β then
αa ∼u βa.
(We call this constraint WSC since it is essentially the same as Rushby’s condi-
tion of Weak Step Consistency [30].) Although it does not mention the policy
explicitly, this constraint is not inconsistent with the state of the policy being a
factor in how u’s knowledge is updated. However, it requires that the way that
the policy is taken into account depends only on information jointly available
to domains u and dom(a).
Next, to factor in the prohibitions to information transfer implied by the
policy, note that one case where the policy clearly prohibits transfer of infor-
mation from a domain dom(a) to u when action a is performed after sequence
α is where α |= dom(a) 6֌ u. Thus, domain u’s state of information in state αa
should be the same as its information in state α in this case. This suggests the
following constraint:
(DLR) For all traces α, and actions a, if α |= dom(a) 6֌ u then αa ∼u α.
The nomenclature DLR arises from the fact that this is essentially a dynamic
generalization of Rushby’s condition of Locally Respects [30]. A slightly stronger
alternative of DLR is the following:
(DLR′) For all traces α, and actions a, if there exists a trace β such that α ∼u β
and α ∼dom(a) β and β |= dom(a) 6֌ u then αa ∼u α.
In fact, in the context of WSC, this is equivalent to DLR.
Proposition 1 If WSC then DLR iff DLR′.
Proof: We assume WSC and DLR and show DLR′. (The other direction is
straightforward.) Suppose that α ∼u β and α ∼dom(a) β and β |= dom(a) 6֌ u.
We need to show αa ∼u α. By WSC, we have αa ∼u βa. Since β |= dom(a) 6֌ u,
we have by DLR that βa ∼u β. Two applications of transitivity now yield that
αa ∼u α, as required. 
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Suppose that we now accept WSC and DLR as reasonable constraints on the
equivalence relations ∼u corresponding to the maximal knowledge that an agent
u is permitted to have. Indexed collections of equivalence relations may be par-
tially ordered by pointwise containment. (That is, we take {∼u}u∈D ≤ {∼′u}u∈D
if ∼u ⊆ ∼
′
u for all u ∈ D.) Given the dynamic policy ֌, let {∼
unw
u }u∈D be
the smallest collection of equivalence relations that is consistent with WSC and
DLR. Intuitively, these smallest relations are the ones that allow for themaximal
amount of information flow in the system that is consistent with the constraints.
(The smaller the equivalence class, the larger the agent’s amount of knowledge.)
We call these relations the unwinding relations. The following fact will be useful
below.
Lemma 2 Suppose ֌ ≤ ֌′ and let {∼unwu }u∈D and {≈
unw
u }u∈D be the un-
winding relations for the policies ֌ and ֌′, respectively. Then ≈unwu ⊆ ∼
unw
u
for all u ∈ D.
Proof: Since dom(a) 6֌′ u implies dom(a) 6֌ u, there are fewer cases of ba-
sic facts αa ∼unwu α than basic facts αa ≈
unw
u α derivable using DLR. By
monotonicity of WSC and the rules for an equivalence relation, it follows that
≈unwu ⊆ ∼
unw
u for all u ∈ D. 
We now take the relations {∼unwu }u∈D as the equivalence relations in the
Kripke structure needed to interpret the distributed knowledge operator in the
definition of the functions tau . We call the derived security notion associated
to these functions ta-security. (Note that since, by reflexivity, if dom(a) = u
then D{u,dom(a)}(dom(a) ֌ u) is valid in this Kripke structure, these functions
are self-aware, so again, by Lemma 1, ta-security and ta-view-security are
equivalent.) For u ∈ D we also write ∼u for the relation on traces defined by
α ∼u β iff ta

u (α) = ta

u (β).
However, we note that we could also take the unwinding relations directly
as the basis for another definition of security:
Definition 3 A system is unwinding-secure with respect to a policy֌ if, for all
traces α, β and domain u, we have α ∼unwu β implies obsu(s0 ·α) = obsu(s0 ·β).
In fact, it turns out that this does not give a new definition of security. The
following result shows that the unwinding relations correspond precisely to the
information flow modelled by the function ta.
Theorem 3.1 We have ∼unwu = ∼

u for all u ∈ D.
Proof: We establish the containments ∼unwu ⊆ ∼

u and ∼

u ⊆ ∼
unw
u .
For ∼unwu ⊆ ∼

u , we argue by induction on the number of steps of a deriva-
tion of the statement α ∼unwu β using rules WSC, DLR and the rules for an
equivalence relation. The cases for reflexivity, transitivity an symmetry are di-
rect from the fact that ∼u has these properties. For the DLR case, suppose
that α |= dom(a) 6֌ u, so that we have αa ∼unwu α. By validity of the formula
DG(φ) ⇒ φ, we have also α |= D{dom(a),u}(dom(a) 6֌ u), so by the definition of
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ta we have αa ∼u α, as required. For the WSC case, suppose that α ∼
unw
u β
and α ∼unw
dom(a) β, so that αa ∼
unw
u βa by WSC. By the inductive hypothesis,
we have α ∼u β and α ∼

dom(a) β, i.e., ta

u (α) = ta

u (β) and ta

dom(a)(α) =
ta
dom(a)(β). Moreover, it also follows that α |= D{dom(a),u}(dom(a) 6֌ u) iff
β |= D{dom(a),u}(dom(a) 6֌ u), so that the same case of the definition of ta
 is
selected in both tau (αa) and ta

u (βa). It follows that ta

u (αa) = ta

u (βa), i.e.,
αa ∼
dom(a) βa, as required.
For ∼u ⊆ ∼
unw
u , we argue by induction on the combined length of α and
β that α ∼
dom(a) β implies α ∼
unw
dom(a) β. The base case of α = β = ǫ is trivial
by reflexivity. By symmetry, it suffices to consider the case of α = αa and β,
where the result has already been established for sequences of shorter combined
length. We suppose that α ∼
dom(a) β, i.e., ta

u (αa) = ta

u (β), and show that
α ∼unw
dom(a) β. We consider two cases, corresponding to the cases of the definition
of ta.
In the first case, we have α |= D{dom(a),u}(dom(a) 6֌ u), so that ta

u (α) =
tau (αa), and hence ta

u (α) = ta

u (β). By induction, we have α ∼
unw
u β. Since
α |= D{dom(a),u}(dom(a) 6֌ u), there exists a trace γ such that α ∼
unw
u γ and
α ∼unw
dom(a) γ and γ |= dom(a) 6֌ u. The relation ∼
unw
u satisfies WSC and DLR
by definition, so by Proposition 1 it also satisfies DLR′. Thus, we obtain that
αa ∼unwu α. It now follows by transitivity that αa ∼
unw
u β, as required.
In the second case, we have α |= D{dom(a),u}(dom(a)֌ u), so that ta

u (αa) =
(tau (α), ta

dom(a)(α), a). Assuming that ta

u (αa) = ta

u (β), it follows that β 6=
ǫ, so we may write β = β′b. If β′ |= D{dom(a),u}(dom(a) 6֌ u), then we may
switch the roles of αa and β′b and argue as above, so it suffices to consider the
case where β′ |= D{dom(a),u}(dom(a) ֌ u). In this case, we have ta

u (β
′b) =
(tau (β
′), ta
dom(b)(β
′), b), so it follows from tau (αa) = ta

u (β) that a = b and
tau (α) = ta

u (β
′) and ta
dom(a)(α) = ta

dom(a)(β
′). That is, we have α ∼unwu β
′
and α ∼unw
dom(a) β
′. By WSC, it follows that αa ∼unwu β
′a = β, as required. 
It is immediate from Theorem 3.1 that unwinding security and ta-security
are equivalent. Thus, these definitions lend support to each other and help to
explain each other: the functions ta give an intuitive, concrete description of
the information flows that are permitted when security is interpreted using the
unwinding relations.
Moreover, Theorem 3.1 shows that ta-security provides a feasible general
framework for security definitions. To instantiate this framework, we must
provide a collection of equivalence relations {∼u}u∈D to be used to interpret
the distributed knowledge operator in the definition. It is reasonable to ask that
however we do so, it should be the case that the resulting relations {∼u }u∈D are
exactly the relations {∼u}u∈D, so that the definition of ta is self-consistent.2
Theorem 3.1 shows that this condition is in fact satisfiable.
There remains some circularity in this justification of the definitions of un-
2It is worth noting that the circularity here is similar to the circularity in the semantics of
knowledge-based programs [14].
16
winding security and ta-security. In particular, these definitions are both
based on the assumption that the constraints WSC and DLR are the only con-
straints that should be applied to the flow of information in order to satisfy the
policy, and that the resulting relations give an acceptable notion of permitted
agent knowledge. However, if a case can be made that further constraints should
be placed on the semantics, then a comparison similar to that made above can
be considered.
The next lemma shows that ta-security implies ta♦-security.
Lemma 3 We have ta♦u (α) = ta
♦
u (β) implies α ∼
unw
u β for all α, β ∈ A
∗ and
all u ∈ D. Moreover, ta-security implies ta♦-security.
Proof: By induction on the combined length of α and β. The base case is trivial
by reflexivity. Consider the case of αa and β, and suppose ta♦u (αa) = ta
♦
u (β).
In case α |= dom(a) 6֌ u, we have ta♦u (αa) = ta
♦
u (α) = ta
♦
u (β), so by
induction we obtain α ∼unwu β. Also, by DLR, we have αa ∼
unw
u α. It follows
that αa ∼unwu β, as required.
Alternately, if α |= dom(a)֌ u, then we have ta♦u (αa) = (ta
♦
u (α), ta
♦
dom(a)(α), a).
It follows that β 6= ǫ, so let β = β′b for b ∈ A. In the case that β′ |= dom(b) 6֌ u,
we may swap the roles of αa and β′b and argue as in the previous paragraph.
In case β′ |= dom(b)֌ u, we have ta♦u (β
′b) = (ta♦u (β
′), ta♦
dom(b)(β
′), b), and it
follows that a = b and ta♦u(α) = ta
♦
u (β
′) and ta♦
dom(a)(α) = ta
♦
dom(a)(β
′). By
induction, we obtain that α ∼unwu β
′ and α ∼unw
dom(a) β
′. It now follows by WSC
that αa ∼unwu β
′a = β, as required. 
The following example shows that ta-security differs from ta♦-security.
Example 3: As already seen in Example 2, the system in Figure 1 is ta♦-
secure. But, we have that p ∼unwB ǫ and p ∼
unw
A ǫ by WSC. By applying DLR,
we obtain pa ∼unwB a. Using Theorem 3.1, we have ta

B(pa) = ta

B(a), and since
obsB(s0 · pa) 6= obsB(s0 · a), the system is not ta-secure. 
3.3 A sufficient condition for equivalence
The outcome of the discussion so far is that we have identified two definitions of
security of dynamic policies, one of which (ta♦-security) takes a permissive in-
terpretation of policies, and the other (ta-security, or equivalently, unwinding
security) takes a prohibitive interpretation. As noted above, these two inter-
pretations may be in conflict for some policies. It is therefore of interest to
understand when a policy is free of this conflict. The following notion is useful
in this regard.
Definition 4 A policy ֌ is local with respect to a collection of equivalence
relations {≈u}u∈D on A∗ if, for all domains u, v ∈ D and traces α, β ∈ A∗, if
α ≈u β and α ≈v β then α |= u֌ v iff β |= u֌ v.
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An equivalent statement is that
α |= D{u,v}(u֌ v) ∨D{u,v}(u 6֌ v)
for all traces α and domains u, v, when the equivalence relation used to interpret
knowledge is ≈-equivalence. That is, a pair of agents always have distributed
knowledge of whether one may interfere with the other.
Example 4: The policy of Example 1 is not a local policy with respect to
the relations {∼♦u}u∈D. For, we have ǫ ∼
♦
A p and ǫ ∼
♦
B p, but ǫ |= A 6֌ B
and p |= A֌ B. We present some examples of classes of local policies in Sec-
tion 3.4. 
We could instantiate the definition of locality with respect to either the
equivalence relations {∼♦u}u∈D or {∼

u }u∈D (equivalently, the unwinding rela-
tions {∼unwu }u∈D). In fact, these definitions prove to be equivalent. We first
remark that, in general, the relations ∼unwu differ from the relations ∼
♦
u . In
particular, α ∼unwu β does not imply α ∼
♦
u β.
Example 5: In this example we proceed with the system of Figure 1. By
DLR, we have from ǫ |= P 6֌ B that p ∼unwB ǫ and from ǫ |= P 6֌ A that
p ∼unwA ǫ. By WSC, we have pa ∼
unw
B a. However, the ta
♦ values of B differ:
ta
♦
B(pa) = (ǫ, ǫ, a) 6= ǫ = ta
♦
B(a). 
However, the relations ∼unwu and ∼
♦
u are identical for policies that are local
with respect to the equivalence relations {∼♦u}u∈D.
Lemma 4 Let֌ be a local policy with respect to {∼♦u}u∈D. Then {∼
♦
u}u∈D =
{∼unwu }u∈D.
Proof: Suppose that the policy֌ is local with respect to {∼♦u}u∈D. Then these
relations satisfy WSC. For, suppose that ta♦u (α) = ta
♦
u (β) and ta
♦
dom(a)(α) =
ta♦
dom(a)(β). Note that, by locality, we have that α |= dom(a)֌ v iff β |=
dom(a)֌ v. It follows that the same case is chosen in the definitions of ta♦u (αa)
and ta♦u (βa), and we obtain that ta
♦
u (αa) = ta
♦
u (βa).
It is immediate from the definition of ta♦ that the relations {∼♦u}u∈D satisfy
DLR. By the previous paragraph, these relations also satisfy WSC. Since {∼unwu
}u∈D are the minimal relations satisfying WSC and DLR, we obtain that {∼unwu
}u∈D ≤ {∼♦u}u∈D. The converse also holds by Lemma 3. 
From this, we obtain the claimed independence of locality on the choice of
equivalence relation.
Lemma 5 A given policy ֌ is local with respect to the associated relations
{∼♦u}u∈D iff it is local with respect to the relations {∼

u }u∈D.
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Proof: First suppose that ֌ is local with respect to {∼♦u}u∈D. Then by
Lemma 4 and Theorem 3.1, we have {∼unwu }u∈D = {∼
♦
u}u∈D = {∼

u }u∈D.
Hence, ֌ is local with respect to {∼u }u∈D.
Suppose now that ֌ is local with respect to {∼u }u∈D. Let u, v ∈ D and
α, β ∈ A∗ with ta♦u (α) = ta
♦
u (β) and ta
♦
v (α) = ta
♦
v (β). By Lemma 3, we have
α ∼unwu β and α ∼
unw
v β. By Theorem 3.1, we have α ∼

u β and α ∼

v β and
hence, α |= u֌ v iff β |= u֌ v. 
Consequently, in the sequel we say simply that the policy is local, if it is
local with respect to either of these relations.
The following result shows that for local policies, the conflict between a
permissive and a prohibitive reading of policies does not arise.
Theorem 3.2 If ֌ is a local policy then ta♦-security and ta-security with
respect to ֌ are equivalent.
Proof: This is immediate from the fact that if the policy is local, then for
all traces α, we have α |= u֌ v iff α |= D{u,v}(u ֌ v). This claim follows
straightforwardly from the properties of distributed knowledge. 
Indeed, locality exactly captures the condition under which the permissive
and the prohibitive interpretations of a policy are equivalent. We need one
technical condition on this statement. Say that a domain u is inactive when
dom−1(u) = ∅, i.e., the domain has no actions that it can perform, so it plays
only the role of an observer in the system. Note that policy edges of the form
α |= u֌ v where u is inactive have no bearing on the definitions of ta♦-security
or unwinding-security (and hence also not on the equivalent ta-security) since
all references to the policy in these definitions occur only in the form α |= u֌ v
with u = dom(a) for some action a. Intuitively, the interference relation u֌ v is
concerned with the ability of domain u to perform actions that transfer informa-
tion to domain v, and for a domain with no actions, such transfer of information
is always impossible. We say that policy֌ has no edges from inactive domains,
when for all domains u that are inactive, we have α |= u 6֌ v for all traces α and
domains v. By the above observation, every policy is semantically equivalent to
one that has no edges from inactive domains, so we may assume this condition
without loss of generality. Subject to this assumption, we have the following:
Theorem 3.3 Let S = 〈D, dom, A〉 be a signature, and let ֌ be a policy for
this signature that has no edges from inactive domains. Suppose that for all
systems M for the signature S, M is ta♦-secure with respect to ֌ iff M is
ta-secure with respect to ֌. Then ֌ is local.
Proof: We prove the converse, that is, we show that if֌ is not local, then ta♦-
security and ta-security with respect to֌ differ on some system M . Suppose
that ֌ is not local. By Lemma 5, we may use the relations {∼♦u}u∈D, so we
have that there exist traces α, β ∈ A∗ and domains u, v such that α ∼♦u β and
α ∼♦v β, and α |= u֌ v and β |= u 6֌ v.
By Lemma 3, we also have α ∼unwu β and α ∼
unw
v β. Since ֌ has no edges
from inactive domains, and α |= u ֌ v, domain u has actions. Let a be any
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action with dom(a) = u. Then, by condition WSC, it follows that αa ∼unwv βa.
Moreover, since α ∼♦v β and β ∼
♦
v βa (because β |= u 6֌ v), we have that
α ∼♦v βa. By α |= u֌ v we have that αa 6∼
♦
v α, so it follows that αa 6∼
♦
v βa.
Define M to be the system with states S = A∗, initial state s0 = ǫ, transi-
tions defined by γ · b = γb for all γ ∈ A∗ and b ∈ A, and observations defined by
obsw(γ) = 0 if w 6= v or γ 6∼♦v αa, and obsw(γ) = 1 otherwise, for all γ ∈ A
∗.
Obviously, obsv(αa) = 1. On the other hand, since αa 6∼♦v βa, we have that
obsv(βa) = 0.
Since αa ∼unwv βa, it is immediate that M is not ta
-secure with respect to
֌. To complete the proof, we note that M is ta♦-secure with respect to֌, so
that the two notions disagree on systemM . To see this, note that any insecurity
must involve domain v, since obsw(γ) = 0 for all γ and w 6= v. However, on
domain v, if γ ∼♦v γ
′ then γ 6∼♦v αa iff γ
′ 6∼♦v αa, so we have obsv(γ) = obsv(γ
′),
as required for ta♦-security. 
Given this result, one reasonable approach to the possibility of conflicting
interpretations of policies is to require that the policy be local, so that we
are left with a single notion of security that supports both the permissive and
prohibitive interpretation of policies. A potential disadvantage of this is that
such a restriction results in a loss of expressiveness: certain policies can no
longer be expressed. The following result shows that, in fact, provided that one
is interested in ta-security, there is no loss of expressiveness: for every policy,
there is a local policy that is equivalent with respect to ta-security.
Lemma 6 For every policy֌ over signature 〈D, dom, A〉, there is a local policy
֌′ ≤֌ such that for all systems M with signature 〈D, dom, A〉, system M is
ta-secure with respect to ֌ iff M is ta-secure with respect to ֌′.
Proof: We write [α]∼ for the equivalence class of α with respect to an equiv-
alence relation ∼. In the following, the unwinding {∼unwu }u∈D refers to the
policy ֌. Define the policy ֌′ by
α |= u֌′ v iff β |= u֌ v for all β ∈ [α]∼unw
u
∩ [α]∼unw
v
.
It is clear that ֌′ ≤֌.
Let {≈unwu }u∈D be the smallest unwinding satisfying WSC and DLR with
respect to the policy ֌′. We claim that ∼unwu = ≈
unw
u for all u ∈ D. By
Lemma 2, we have ≈unwu ⊆ ∼
unw
u for all u ∈ D.
We will show that for every u ∈ D and every α, β ∈ A∗, we have α ≈unwu β
implies α ∼unwu β. The proof is by an induction on the length of the derivation
of α ≈unwu β. Consider a derivation of α ≈
unw
u β and suppose that the claim
holds for all shorter derivations. We need to show that α ∼unwu β. The cases
where the final step of the derivation are an application of reflexivity, symmetry
or transitivity are straightforward from the fact that ∼unwu is an equivalence
relation. There are two remaining cases:
• Case 1: α ≈unwu β is derived using the condition DLR. Here we have
that there exists a ∈ A such that α = βa and β |= dom(a) 6֌ u. Thus,
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there exists a trace γ such that γ ∼unwu β and γ ∼
unw
dom(a) β such that
β |= dom(a) 6֌ u. By Proposition 1, we have that ∼unwu satisfies DLR
′. It
follows that α ∼unwu β.
• Case 2: α ≈unwu β is derived using condition WSC. Hence we have α =
α′a and β = β′a with α′ ≈unwu β
′ and α′ ≈unw
dom(a) β
′. By applying the
induction hypothesis, we have α′ ∼unwu β
′ and α′ ∼unw
dom(a) β
′ and by the
WSC condition applied to ∼unwu , we have α
′a ∼unwu β
′a.
This shows that the system M is ta-secure with respect to֌ if and only if it
is ta-secure with respect to ֌′.
It remains to show that the policy ֌′ is ta♦-local. First, we will show for
every u ∈ D and every α, β ∈ A∗, that ta♦u (α) = ta
♦
u (β) (with respect to ֌
′)
implies α ≈unwu β. We prove this by an induction on the combined length of α
and β. The base case of α = β = ǫ is trivial by reflexivity of ≈unwu .
Assume the claim for all traces of combined length shorter than |α|+ |β|. Let
α = α′a and suppose that ta♦u (α) = ta
♦
u (β). We need to show that α
′a ≈unwu β.
• Case 1: α′ |= dom(a) 6֌′ u. In this case, we have ta♦u (α
′a) = ta♦u (α
′),
so ta♦u (α
′) = ta♦u (β). By induction hypothesis, we have α
′ ≈unwu β. By
DLR, we have α′a ≈unwu α
′, so by transitivity we obtain α′a ≈unwu β.
• Case 2: α′ |= dom(a)֌′ u. Then ta♦u (α
′a) = (ta♦u (α
′), ta♦
dom(a)(α
′), a),
so β 6= ǫ and we have β = β′b for some b ∈ A. We may assume that
β′ |= dom(b)֌′ u, since otherwise we may argue as in Case 1 for β′b
and apply symmetry. It follows that ta♦u (β
′b) = (ta♦u (β
′), ta♦
dom(b)(β
′), b),
and we conclude that a = b and ta♦u (α
′) = ta♦u (β
′) and ta♦
dom(a)(α
′) =
ta
♦
dom(a)(β
′). By induction hypothesis we have α′ ≈unwu β
′ and α′ ≈unw
dom(a) β
′
and by WSC, we obtain that α′a ≈unwu β
′a.
The ta♦-locality follows: if ta♦u (α) = ta
♦
u (β) and ta
♦
v (α) = ta
♦
v (β) (with re-
spect to ֌′), then we have α ∈ [β]≈unw
u
∩ [β]≈unw
v
and hence α |= u֌′ v iff
β |= u֌′ v. 
We say that two policies ֌ and ֌′ for a common signature 〈D, dom, A〉
are identical up to inactive domains, if for all domains u, v ∈ D such that the
set of actions dom−1(u) of domain u is nonempty, we have, for all α ∈ A∗,
that α |= u֌ v iff α |= u֌′ v. Intuitively, this says that the two policies
are identical, except that they may differ on edges α |= u֌′ v from inactive
domains u. Since such a domain u cannot take any action to cause information
flow to v, this difference cannot, in practice, be detected. The following result
makes this intuition precise. Say that two policies ֌ and ֌′ are two policies
for a common signature are equivalent with respect to a notion of security if for
all systems M for the signature, M is secure with respect to ֌ iff M is secure
with respect to ֌′.
Theorem 3.4 Suppose that֌ and֌′ are two policies for a common signature
〈D, dom, A〉. Then ֌ and ֌′ are equivalent with respect to ta♦-security iff ֌
and ֌′ are identical up to inactive domains.
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Proof: In this proof, ta♦,֌ and ta♦,֌
′
denote the ta♦ function that refers
to ֌ and ֌′, respectively. Suppose first that ֌ and ֌′ are identical up to
inactive domains. Then a straightforward induction on the length of α ∈ A∗
shows that for all u ∈ D, we have ta♦,֌u (α) = ta
♦,֌′
u (α). (Note that in the
inductive case for ta♦u (αa), we have that a ∈ dom
−1(dom(a)) 6= ∅, so dom(a)֌ u
iff dom(a) ֌′ u.) It follows that ֌ and ֌′ are equivalent with respect to
ta♦-security.
Conversely, suppose that֌ and֌′ are not identical up to inactive domains.
We show that they are not equivalent with respect to ta♦-security. We have
that there exists α ∈ A∗ and domains u, v with dom−1(u) nonempty, such that
(without loss of generality) α |= u֌ v but not α |= u֌′ v. Let a be an action
with dom(a) = u. Then ta♦,֌v (αa) 6= ta
♦,֌
v (α) but ta
♦,֌′
v (αa) = ta
♦,֌′
v (α).
Define the systemM with states S = A∗, transitions β ·b = βb for all β ∈ A∗ and
b ∈ A, and observations given by obsw(β) = 0 if either w 6= v or ta♦,֌w (β) 6=
ta♦,֌w (α), otherwise obsw(β) = 1. Then, by construction, M is ta
♦-secure
with respect to ֌. But we have obsv(αa) = 0 and obsv(α) = 1, so M is not
ta♦-secure with respect to ֌′. Thus, these policies disagree on M . 
In particular, it follows that if֌′ is a nonlocal policy that has no edges from
inactive domains (so that the reason for nonlocality is not trivial, in the sense
that it must involve edges from a domain with a nonempty set of actions), then
there is no local policy that is equivalent with respect to ta♦-security. Thus,
ta♦-security is inherently a more expressive notion than ta-security.
3.4 Special Cases
To judge the adequacy of a definition of security with respect to dynamic poli-
cies, it is useful to verify that the definition gives the expected answer in a
number of simple scenarios where we have clear intuitions about the desired
behaviour of the definition. The following provide some examples.
3.4.1 Static Policies:
We say that a dynamic policy ֌⊆ D × A∗ ×D is static, if for all α ∈ A∗ and
u, v ∈ D, we have α |= u֌ v iff ǫ |= u֌ v. That is, the policy never changes
from its initial state. A static policy ֌ may equivalently be presented as the
relation π1,3(֌) ⊆ D × D, the projection of the dynamic policy to the first
and third components, which is in precisely the format for classical intransitive
noninterference policies [15].
Static policies are a special case of dynamic policies, that have been subject
to a significant amount of study [17, 29, 30, 34], so it is reasonable to expect
that any definition for dynamic policies should reduce to an accepted definition
when applied to the static case. The following result shows that this is the case.
Theorem 3.5 If ֌ is a static policy, then the following are equivalent:
• M is ta♦-secure with respect to ֌,
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• M is ta-secure with respect to ֌,
• M is TA-secure with respect to π1,3(֌).
Proof: This is immediate from the definitions, together with the fact that for
static policies֌, we have α |= u֌ v iff α |= D{u,v}(u֌ v) iff (u, v) ∈ π1,3(֌
). 
This result shows that ta♦-security and ta-security agree and collapse
to the standard notion of ta-security when restricted to static policies. This
provides support for these definitions.
3.4.2 Globally known policies:
Another setting that can serve as a useful test case for the adequacy of definitions
of security for dynamic policies is a group of agents subject to an information
flow policy that is set by a policy authority P , and in which all agents are
permitted to know the policy state at all times.
Formally, these are dynamic policies in which the set of domains contains P ,
and we have the following:
(GK1) For all traces α and domains u, we have that α |= P ֌ u. That is,
domain P , which controls the policy state, is always permitted to transmit
information to u. This ensures that u is always able to know the policy
state.
(GK2) For all traces α, β and domains u, v, we have that α|P = β|P implies
that α |= u֌ v iff β |= u֌ v. That is, the policy setting depends only
on the past actions of domain P .
We say that a dynamic policy ֌ satisfying these conditions is globally known.
Theorem 3.6 If the policy ֌ is globally known, then it is local.
Proof: Suppose that the policy֌ is globally known. We need to show that for
all u, v ∈ D and α, β ∈ A∗, we have α ∼unwu β and α ∼
unw
v β implies α |= u֌ v
iff β |= u֌ v. We claim that, in fact, α ∼unwu β implies α|P = β|P , from which
the desired result follows using GK2.
The proof of the claim is by induction on the length of the derivation of
α ∼unwu β. The base case of a step in which α ∼
unw
u β is reflexivity by reflex-
ivity is trivial, and the cases of steps using symmetry or transitivity are also
straightforward.
Consider a step using DLR. Then α = βa and we have α |= dom(a)֌ u. By
GK1, we have dom(a) 6= P . Thus α|P = αa|P = β|P , as required.
Finally, consider a step using WSC. Then α = α′a and β = β′a for some
action a, and we have α′ ∼unwu β
′ and α′ ∼unw
dom(a) β
′. From α′ ∼unwu β
′, we obtain
by induction that α|P = β|P . It follows that α|P = α′a|P = β′a|P = β|P , as
required. 
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Since by Theorem 3.2, for local policies the definitions of ta♦-security and
ta-security are equivalent, these definitions are equivalent for all globally
known policies, so these definitions lend mutual support to each other in this
case.
3.4.3 Locally known policies:
A slightly more general case in which the notions of ta♦-security and ta-
security coincide are policies in which agents are always aware of their incoming
and/or outgoing policy edges. Formally, define say that the policy ֌ is locally
known to the sender (with respect to equivalence relations {∼unwu }u∈D) if we
have, for all u, v ∈ D, that α ∼unwu β implies α |= u֌ v iff β |= u֌ v.
Similarly, say that the policy ֌ is locally known to the receiver if we have, for
all u, v ∈ D, that α ∼unwu β implies α |= v֌ u iff β |= v֌ u. It is easily
seen that if the policy is locally known to the sender and/or the receiver (with
respect to either ∼ or ∼♦), then it is local. Thus, this again is a case where
the notions of ta♦-security and ta-security are equivalent.
3.5 Related Work using Automaton Semantics
To make the case for our definitions above, we now compare them to related
prior work that is also stated in an automaton based semantics. (We defer dis-
cussion of related programming language-based work to Section 7.) To the best
of our knowledge, the only other semantics for dynamic intransitive noninter-
ference policies in automaton-based systems are those of Leslie [22] and Eggert
et. al. [11]. Both works deal with policy enhanced systems. Recall that in this
model, we write s |= u֌ v iff information flow from u to v is allowed in the
state s.
Leslie’s definition of intransitive noninterference is a direct adaption of Rushby’s
ipurge function [30] to the dynamic setting. Similar to Rushby’s ipurge func-
tion, Leslie’s purge function is based on a “source” function. Formally, the
dynamic version of this function is defined for every u ∈ D and s ∈ S by
dsrc(ǫ, u, s) = {u} and for α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A by dsrc(aα, u, s) = dsrc(α, u, s ·
a)∪{dom(a)} if there is some v ∈ dsrc(α, u, s ·a) with s |= dom(a)֌ v, and else
dsrc(aα, u, s) = dsrc(α, u, s · a). Intuitively, the set dsrc(aα, u, s) is the set of
all agents, to which the information that the action a has been performed, is
transmitted by the sequence of actions α.
Leslie’s purge function for intransitive noninterference is inductively defined
for every u ∈ D, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and α ∈ A∗ by Lpurge(ǫ, u, s) = ǫ and
Lpurge(aα, u, s) = a Lpurge(α, u, s · a)
if there is some v ∈ dsrc(aα, u, s) with s |= dom(a)֌ v, and else Lpurge(aα, u, s) =
Lpurge(α, u, s·a). This function removes exactly those actions from a trace that
are from agents where interference to u is forbidden by the policy. The corre-
sponding security definition is:
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Figure 2: Non-monotony of Lpurge-security
Definition 5 A system M is Lpurge-secure with respect to a policy ֌ if for
all domains u and sequences of actions α holds: obsu(s0 · Lpurge(α, u, s0)) =
obsu(s0 · α).
Our notion of ta♦-security is incomparable to Lpurge-security, in the sense
that neither of them implies the other. One the one hand, on systems with a
static policy, Lpurge-security is equivalent to Rushby’s IP-security and hence, as
shown in [34], strictly weaker than TA-security, which is the equivalent to ta♦-
security on such systems. On the other hand, the following example presents a
ta♦-secure, but not Lpurge-secure system.
Example 6: We consider again the system in Figure 1. As shown in Exam-
ple 2, this system is ta♦-secure. However the system is not Lpurge-secure,
since we have obsB(s0 · Lpurge(pa,B, s0)) = obsB(s0 · Lpurge(a,B, s1)) =
obsB(s0 · a) = 0 6= 1 = obsB(s0 · pa). 
Similar to ta♦-security, Lpurge-security is not monotonic with respect to
the restrictiveness order on policies.
Example 7: The system in Figure 2 has two different configurations of the dy-
namic policy indicated by the dotted policy edge in state s1: in one configuration
there is an edge from D to L and in the other, this edge is absent. First, consider
the configuration where this edge exists. With respect to Lpurge-security, this
system is insecure, since we have Lpurge(hd, L, s0) = Lpurge(d, L, s1) = d, but
obsL(s0 · hd) = 0 6= 1 = obsL(s0 · d).
However, if we remove the edge from D to L in state s1, this system becomes
Lpurge-secure: all traces starting with h will be purged to ǫ and all traces start-
ing with d have a purge value different from ǫ. 
Our notion of ta is strictly stronger than Lpurge-security. That these two
are indeed different follows from the same argument as above for systems with
static policies.
Lemma 7 Every ta-secure system is Lpurge-secure.
Proof: We show this lemma by contraposition. Suppose that the system is not
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Lpurge-secure. Then there are u ∈ D and α ∈ A∗ with
obsu(s0 · α) 6= obsu(s0 · Lpurge(α, u, s0)) .
We will show the following claim: For every β, β′ ∈ A∗ with α = ββ′ and
for every γ ∈ A∗ with Lpurge(α, u, s0) = γ Lpurge(β′, u, s0 · β) and for every
v ∈ dsrc(β′, u, s0 · β), we have β ∼unwv γ.
We prove this claim by an induction on β. For the base case with β = ǫ,
we have that α = β′ and hence γ = ǫ from which the claim is immediate. For
the inductive step, let β = β˜b for some action b. The induction hypothesis
is: For some γ with Lpurge(α, u, s0) = γ Lpurge(bβ
′, u, s0 · β˜) and every v ∈
dsrc(bβ′, u, s0 · β˜), we have β˜ ∼
unw
v γ.
We consider the following two cases:
• Case 1: dom(a) /∈ dsrc(bβ′, u, s0 · β˜). In this case, we have
dsrc(bβ′, u, s0 · β˜) = dsrc(β
′, u, s0 · β˜b)
and
Lpurge(bβ′, u, s0 · β˜) = Lpurge(β
′, u, s0 · β˜b) .
Hence, the new value of γ is the same as the previous value. And since
s0 · β˜ |= dom(b)֌ v, by DLR, for every v ∈ dsrc(β′, u, s0 · β˜b), we have
β˜b ∼unwv β˜, and combined with β˜ ∼
unw
v γ the claim follows.
• Case 2: dom(a) ∈ dsrc(bβ′, u, s0 ·β˜). In this case, we have dsrc(bβ′, u, s0 ·
β˜) = {dom(b)} ∪ dsrc(β′, u, s0 · β˜b). Since
Lpurge(α, u, s0) = γ Lpurge(bβ
′, u, s0 · β˜)
= γb Lpurge(β′, u, s0 · β˜b) ,
the new value of γ is γ′ = γb. For every v ∈ dsrc(β′, u, s0 · β˜b), we have
β˜ ∼unwv γ by induction hypothesis and additionally β˜ ∼
unw
dom(b) γ. From
the condition WSC it follows for every such v: β˜b ∼unwv γb = γ
′. From
this claim it follows α ∼unwu Lpurge(α, u, s0) with β = α and hence the
system is not ta-secure. 
In [11], some problems with Lpurge-security are identified and a new purge-
based security definition is proposed in response. This notion uses the same dy-
namic sources function as Leslie’s does, but the purge function does not change
in the state parameter if an action has been removed. More precisely, their
dynamic intransitive purge function is defined for every u ∈ D and s ∈ S by
ipurge(ǫ, u, s) = ǫ and for every a ∈ A and α ∈ A∗ if dom(a) ∈ dsrc(aα, u, s),
then ipurge(aα, u, s) = a ipurge(α, u, s·a) and else ipurge(aα, u, s) = ipurge(α, u, s).
The notion of i-security is defined as usual as the property that for all agent u, all
states s, and all action sequences α and β with ipurge(α, u, s) = ipurge(β, u, s),
we have obsu(s · α) = obsu(s · β).
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Figure 3: A ta-secure, but not i-secure system
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Figure 4: Relations between dynamic intransitive noninterference definitions
This notion of security is incomparable with our security definitions of ta♦-
security and ta-security. On the one hand, we have, due to the static case, that
i-security does not imply ta♦-security. The following example gives a system,
with a local policy, that is ta-secure and ta♦-secure, but not i-secure.
Example 8: The system in Figure 3 is clearly not i-secure. We consider the
traces hd and d since the ipurge values of these two traces are the same for L
if one starts purging in s0: ipurge(hd, L, s0) = ipurge(d, L, s0) = d. But the
observations after these two traces are different for L.
However, for any trace that starts with an h action, the ta♦ value is ǫ, and
for any trace that starts with a d action, the ta♦ value differs from ǫ. Hence,
for any two traces that lead to different observations for L have different ta♦
values. Note, that the dynamic policy of this system is local, and hence, this
system is also ta-secure.
We would argue that this system is intuitively secure, so this gives grounds
to prefer our two definitions over i-security. First, note that in every state D
is permitted to learn about H actions, so, in particular, it should be permitted
for D to know in state s0 that H has not yet acted. In state s2, L can deduce
that D acted before H did, but D was permitted to transfer its information
to L when it acted, so this is not an insecurity. Finally, L cannot distinguish
state s1 from s0, so this state is secure on the grounds that the initial state of a
system always is (noninterference definitions, intuitively, aim to prohibit agents
from learning information about what has happened in a system). 
Although i-security implies Lpurge-security, Example 8 shows that these
security definitions still differ on systems with local policies. The implications
of the security definitions analyzed in this work are depicted in Figure 4. All
these implications are strict in general, and the definitions of ta-security and
ta♦-security only collapse on systems with local policies.
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We can summarize our reasons for preferring the definitions of the present
paper to these prior works as follows. First, both Lpurge-security and i-security
are equivalent to Rushby’s IP-security in the case of static policies. This means
that these definitions are are subject to the problems identified by van der
Meyden [34]. One of these problems is an example presented in [34], which shows
that Rushby’s IP-security fails to detect a covert channel based on ordering of
actions. A second weakness is that IP-security has a weaker relationship to the
unwinding proof method for intransitive non-interference proposed by Rushby
[30] than does ta-security. As shown in [34], this proof method is sound but not
complete for IP-security, but both sound and complete for TA-security. Since
the proof method is itself is based on well-founded intuitions, this lends further
support to TA-security. (We establish a related completeness result for ta-
security and ta♦-security with respect to local dynamic policies in the following
section, that shows that a similar justification exists for these extensions of TA-
security to the dynamic case.) Secondly, when we consider Lpurge-security and
i-security with respect to dynamic policies, there are examples for each where
they give intuitively incorrect results. We refer to [11] for examples showing
Lpurge-security yields undesirable conclusions. Example 8 shows that i-security
can also yield undesirable results.
3.6 Policy Refinement
Recall that֌ ≤֌′ says that policy֌ is more restrictive than policy֌′. We
therefore expect that if a system is secure with respect to ֌, it is also secure
with respect to ֌′. The following result shows that ta-security behaves as
expected with respect to this order.
Proposition 2 If ֌ ≤ ֌′ and system M is ta-secure with respect to ֌,
then M is ta-secure with respect to ֌′.
Proof: This follows from the equivalence of ta-security and unwinding-security.
Let ֌ ≤ ֌′ and let {∼unwu }u∈D and {≈
unw
u }u∈D be the unwinding relations
for the policies ֌ and ֌′, respectively. By Lemma 2, we have ≈unwu ⊆ ∼
unw
u
for all u ∈ D. Suppose that M is unwinding secure with respect to ֌. Then
α ≈unwu β implies α ∼
unw
u β, which yields obsu(s0 ·α) = obsu(s0 ·β), as required
for M to be secure with respect to ֌′. 
The following example illustrates a further subtlety concerning ta♦-security:
unlike ta-security, it is not monotonic with respect to the restrictiveness order
on policies.
Example 9: Figure 5 shows a system and a policy ֌ for two agents A,B.
Only the observations of agent B are depicted; for agent A we assume that
obsA(s) = 0 for all states s, so that there can be no insecurity with respect
to agent A. For agent B, the only possible cases of ta♦-insecurity are when
obsB(s0 · α) = 1 and obsB(s0 · β) = 0. This implies that we have α = abaα′
and that aba is not a prefix of β. However, in this case, ta♦B(β) cannot contain
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Figure 5: The permissive interpretation is not monotonic: policy ֌
a subterm a, since there are no strict prefixes γ of β with γ |= A֌ B. On
the other hand, ta♦B(abaα
′) always contains a subterm a, since ta♦B(aba) =
((ǫ, ǫ, b), (ǫ, ǫ, a), a). Thus, we cannot have ta♦B(abaα) = ta
♦
B(β). It follows that
the system is ta♦-secure with respect to ֌. We note that the policy ֌ is not
local, because ta♦A(ab) = ta
♦
A(ba) = (ǫ, ǫ, a) and ta
♦
B(ab) = ta
♦
B(ba) = (ǫ, ǫ, b),
but ab |= A֌ B while ba |= A 6֌ B.
On the other hand, consider the policy ֌′, which is defined identically to
֌, except that on state s6 we take s6 |= A֌′ B. Plainly, ֌ ≤ ֌′. How-
ever, the system is not ta♦-secure with respect to ֌′. Note that with respect
to policy ֌′, we have ta♦B(aba) = ((ǫ, ǫ, b), (ǫ, ǫ, a), a) = ta
♦
B(baa), whereas
obsB(s0 · aba) = 1 and obsB(s0 · baa) = 0. 
However, for local policies, ta♦-security behaves as expected. This follows
from Proposition 2, the equivalence of ta♦-security and ta-security for local
policies. The following result shows that, in fact it holds slightly more generally,
and we can also use monotonicity to derive ta♦-security for non-local policies.
Proposition 3 Suppose that ֌ ≤ ֌′ and that ֌ is local. If a system M is
ta♦-secure with respect to ֌, then M is ta♦-secure with respect to ֌′.
Proof: Let M be a ta♦-secure system with respect to ֌. Since ֌ is local,
we obtain from Theorem 3.2 that M is ta-secure with respect to ֌. By
Proposition 2, the system is ta-secure with respect to֌′. Since ta-security
implies ta♦-security (by Lemma 3 and Theorem 3.1), we have that M is ta♦-
secure with respect to ֌′. 
4 Proof Techniques
In the theory of static (intransitive) noninterference policies, unwinding relations
provide a proof technique that can be used to show that a system is secure. An
unwinding relation is a relation on the states of the system that satisfies certain
conditions. We show in this section that a similar technique applies to dynamic
policies. In fact, the conditions that we need are very similar to those defined
on the policy above, with the main difference being that they are stated with
respect to states of the system rather than traces.
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4.1 Proof technique for ta-security
LetM be a system and let ≈u be an equivalence relation on the states ofM for
each u ∈ D.
(DLRM ) If α |= dom(a) 6֌ u then s0 · αa ≈u s0 · α.
(WSCM ) If s ≈u t and s ≈dom(a) t then s · a ≈u t · a.
(OCM ) If s ≈u t then obsu(s) = obsu(t).
We call a collection {≈u}u∈D of equivalence relations satisfying DLRM , WSCM
and OCM a -unwinding on M with respect to ֌.
We remark that for policy-enhanced systems, we have the following version
of DLRM :
(DLR-PEM ) If s |= dom(a) 6֌ u then s · a ≈u s.
which formulates the conditions to uniformly quantify over states of the system
rather than both over states and traces. It is straightforward to show that if a
policy-enhanced system M satisfies DLR-PEM then it satisfies DLRM .
The following result states that to prove ta-security, it suffices to show
that there exists a -unwinding on the system.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose that there exist equivalence relations {≈u}u∈D on the
states of a system M satisfying DLRM , WSCM and OCM with respect to a
policy ֌. Then M is ta-secure with respect to ֌.
Proof: To show thatM is ta-secure, we argue that the relations {∼unwu }u∈D,
which by definition satisfy WSC and DLR, also satisfy OC. For this, we claim
that for all α, β ∈ A∗, if α ∼unwu β then s0 · α ≈u s0 · β. It is then immediate
from OCM that OC holds for ∼unwu .
The proof of the claim is by induction on the derivation of α ∼unwu β. The
cases of α ∼unwu β obtained by reflexivity, symmetry or transitivity are straight-
forward, using the fact that ≈u has these properties. For DLR, if α ∼unwu β
is obtained by an application of DLR then α = βa for some a ∈ A with
α |= dom(a) 6֌ u. By DLRM , we have s0 · α ≈u s0 · β, as required. For WSC,
suppose that α ∼unwu β is obtained by an application of WSC, so that we have
α = α′a and β = β′a. where α ∼unwu β and α ∼
unw
dom(a) β. By induction, we have
s0 · α
′ ≈u s0 · β
′ and s0 · α
′ ≈dom(a) s0 · β
′. We now obtain s0 · α
′a ≈u s0 · β
′a by
WSCM , i.e., s0 · α ≈u s0 · β, as required. 
An unwinding on the system can often be naturally defined. We give an
example below in the case of access control systems.
We may also show that unwindings provide a complete proof method, modulo
the fact that we may need to work in a bisimilar system, rather than the system
as presented. (See [34] for an example that demonstrates that, already for
static policies, we do not obtain completeness if we require that the unwinding
be defined over the states of the system M itself. A more complex type of
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unwinding on the system M itself is shown to be complete for TA-security of
static policies in [12]. It would be interesting to develop a generalization of this
to the dynamic case, but we leave this for future work.)
Theorem 4.2 Suppose that M is ta-secure with respect to ֌. Then there
exists a system M ′ that is bisimilar to M (specifically, we may take M ′ =
unfold(M)), such that there exist equivalence relations {≈′u}u∈D on the states
of M ′ satisfying DLRM ′ , WSCM ′ and OCM ′ with respect to policy ֌.
Proof: Suppose that M is ta-secure with respect to ֌. Then the relations
{∼unwu }u∈D are defined on the states of M
′ = unfold(M), and by definition,
satisfy WSC andDLR. These are equivalent to WSCM ′ and DLRM ′ . Moreover,
by Theorem 3.1, we have that ∼unwu = ∼

u for all u ∈ D, so OCM ′ follows from
the fact that M is ta-secure. 
4.2 Proof technique for ta♦-security
A similar proof theory can be developed for the notion ta♦-security. We replace
the condition WSCM by the following:
(WSC♦M ) If α |= dom(a)֌ u and β |= dom(a)֌ u and s0 · α ≈u s0 · β and
s0 · α ≈dom(a) s0 · β then s0 · αa ≈u s0 · βa.
On policy enhanced systems M , it is easily seen that the following variant is
sufficient for WSC♦M to hold:
(WSC-PE♦M ) If s |= dom(a)֌ u and t |= dom(a)֌ u and s ≈u t and s ≈dom(a) t
then s · a ≈u t · a.
Theorem 4.3 Suppose that there exist equivalence relations {≈u}u∈D on the
states of a system M satisfying DLRM , WSC
♦
M and OCM with respect to a
policy ֌. Then M is ta♦-secure with respect to ֌.
Proof: We claim that for all α, β ∈ A∗ we have ta♦u (α) = ta
♦
u (β) implies that
s0 · α ≈u s0 · β. It follows from this using OCM that M is ta♦-secure.
To prove the claim we proceed by induction on |α| + |β|. The base case of
α = β = ǫ is trivial. For the inductive case, suppose (without loss of generality)
that α = α′a, and we have ta♦u (α) = ta
♦
u (β). There are two possibilities:
• α |= dom(a) 6֌ u. In this case we have ta♦u (α
′) = ta♦u (α) = ta
♦
u (β), so
by the inductive hypothesis, we have s0 · α′ ≈u s0 · β. By DLRM , we also
have that s0 · α′a ≈u s0 · α′. Since ≈u is an equivalence relation, we have
s0 · α ≈u s0 · β.
• α |= dom(a)֌ u. In this case, ta♦u (α) = (ta
♦
u (α), ta
♦
dom(a)(α), a). It
follows that β 6= ǫ, so we may write β = β′b for some β′ ∈ A∗ and b ∈ A.
If β′ |= dom(b) 6֌ u, we may reverse the roles of α and β and obtain
that s0 · α ≈u s0 · β using the argument of the previous case. If β′ |=
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dom(b)֌ u, then ta♦u (β) = (ta
♦
u (β
′), ta♦
dom(b)(β
′), b), and we conclude that
a = b and ta♦u (α
′) = ta♦u (β
′) and ta♦
dom(a)(α
′) = ta♦
dom(a)(β
′). By the
inductive hypothesis, we have s0 · α′ ≈u s0 · β′ and s0 · α′ ≈dom(a) s0 · β
′.
Using WSC♦M it follows that s0 · α
′a ≈u s0 · β′a, i.e., s0 · α ≈u s0 · β. 
We also have completeness of the technique, provided we allow its application
on a bisimilar system:
Theorem 4.4 Suppose that M is ta-secure with respect to ֌. Then there
exists a system M ′ that is bisimilar to M and there exist equivalence relations
{≈u}u∈D on the states of a system M ′ satisfying DLRM ′ , WSC
♦
M ′ and OCM ′
with respect to policy ֌.
Proof: LetM = 〈S, s0,→, D, dom, A, obs〉. We takeM ′ = 〈S′, s′0,→
′, D, dom, A, obs′〉
to be the system over the same signature (D, dom, A) with states S′ = A∗, initial
state s′0 = ǫ, transitions →
′ defined by α · a = αa for all α ∈ A∗, and observa-
tions defined obs′u(α) = obsu(s0 ·α) for all α ∈ S
′. It is easily checked that this
system is bisimilar to M .
We show that the relations {∼♦u}u∈D satisfy DLRM ′ , WSC
♦
M ′ and OCM ′
with respect to policy ֌. Note that for all α ∈ A∗, we have s′0 · α = α. For
condition DLRM ′ , note that if α |= dom(a) 6֌ u then ta♦u (αa) = ta
♦
u (α), so
αa ∼♦u α. For condition WSC
♦
M ′ , note that if α |= dom(a) 6֌ u and β |=
dom(a) 6֌ u and α ∼♦u β and α ∼
♦
dom(a) β then
ta♦u (αa) = (ta
♦
u(α), ta
♦
dom(a)(α), a)
= (ta♦u(β), ta
♦
dom(a)(β), a)
= ta♦u (βa)
hence αa ∼♦u βa. Condition OCM ′ is immediate from the fact that M (and
hence M ′) is ta♦-secure. 
5 Access Control in Dynamic Systems
Access control monitors are a fundamental security mechanism that can be
used to enforce a variety of policies. Rushby [30] showed that access control can
provide a sound enforcement mechanism for static intransitive noninterference
policies, and that a simple static check of the access control table suffices to
verify the policy will be enforced. It was later shown by van der Meyden [34]
that, in fact, access control is also a complete enforcement mechanism for such
policies, in the sense that every system that satisfies the policy is bisimilar to
one using access control, with a setting that satisfies the static check. In this
section, we develop a generalization of these results to dynamic noninterference
policies.
A system with structured state, is a system equipped with
• a set of all possible objects O,
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• a set of all possible values V ,
• a function contents: O × S → V ,
• a function observe: D × S → P(O),
• a function alter : D × S → P(O).
Intuitively, contents(o, s) is the value of object o in state s, observe(u, s) is
the set of objects that domain u is permitted to observe (or read) in state s, and
alter(u, s) is the set of objects that domain u is permitted to alter (or write) in
state s. The pair of functions observe, alter can be thought of as an encoding
of an access control table that varies with the state of the system.
We make an assumption on the set O of objects, namely, that this contains
a special object oset(u) for each domain u ∈ D. We write the set of all these
special objects as Osets(D) = {oset(u) | u ∈ D} and assume Osets(D) ⊆ O.
We assume that contents(oset(u), s) = observe(u, s), so that the content of
oset(u) is the set of all objects that are observable to u. Furthermore, we
assume that oset(u) ∈ observe(u, s) for all domains u ∈ D and states s ∈ S,
i.e., the object oset(u) is always observable by u. This is intuitively reasonable,
given the meaning of this object, since domain u can always determine the value
of oset(u) by checking directly which objects it is able to observe.
The motivation for these special objects oset(u) is that they are a kind
of “meta-object” that can be used to specify if an agent is allowed to change
the observable objects of another agent. More precisely, we may let oset(u) ∈
alter(v, s) if and only if in state s, domain v is allowed to influence which
objects are observable by u.
We now state a number of conditions (resembling Rushby’s “reference mon-
itor conditions” [30]) that are intended to capture the intuitive semantics of the
access control functions observe, alter, as they might be enforced by a refer-
ence monitor that restricts agents’ ability to read and write objects as these ac-
cess control settings change. The conditions are cast in terms of the relations≈u,
for u ∈ D, defined by s ≈u t iff for all o ∈ observe(u, s), we have contents(o, s) =
contents(o, t). Intuitively, s ≈u t when the objects observable by domain
u have the same values in the states s and t. Note that because oset(u) ∈
observe(u, s), it is always that case that observe(u, s) = observe(u, t) when
s ≈u t. It follows that the relations ≈u are in fact equivalence relations. Our
new “dynamic reference monitor” conditions are the following:
DRM-1 If s ≈u t, then obsu(s) = obsu(t).
DRM-2 If o ∈ alter(dom(a), s)∩alter(dom(a), t) and s ≈dom(a) t and contents(o, s) =
contents(o, t) then contents(o, s · a) = contents(o, t · a).
DRM-3 If contents(o, s · a) 6= contents(o, s), then o ∈ alter(dom(a), s).
DRM-4 observe(u, s · a)\observe(u, s)⊆observe(dom(a), s).
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DRM-5 If α |= v֌ u and β |= v֌ u and s0 ·α ≈u s0 ·β and s0 ·α ≈v s0 ·β, then
observe(u, s0 ·α)∩alter(v, s0 ·α) = observe(u, s0 ·β)∩alter(v, s0 ·β).
DRM-6 If alter(u, s0 · α) ∩ observe(v, s0 · α) 6= ∅, then α |= u֌ v.
Intuitively, condition DRM-1 says that a domain’s observation depends only on
the contents of the objects observable to the domain. Condition DRM-2 says that
when a domain is permitted to alter an object, the new value of the object
depends only on its previous value and the values of the objects observable by
the acting domain. (The version of this constraint given here follows [34] rather
than [30].) Condition DRM-3 can be understood as stating that an action can
change the value of an object only when the domain of the action is permitted
by the access control setting to alter the object. Condition DRM-4 states that
any object that is made newly observable to a domain u by an action a must
be observable to the domain dom(a).
Condition DRM-5 is a kind of locality constraint, which states that when v is
permitted to interfere with u, in situation s, the set observe(u, s)∩ alter(v, s)
of objects that u can observe and v can alter depends only on information local
to domains u and v, as captured by the relations ≈u and ≈v. We note that this
constraint actually only states a weak property of alter(v, s), as we already
have that observe(u, s) depends only on the local state of u as captured by ≈u.
The following stronger version of this condition is also of interest:
DRM-5′ If s ≈u t and s ≈v t, then observe(u, s) ∩ alter(v, s) = observe(u, t) ∩
alter(v, t).
Here we have dropped the requirement that v be permitted to interfere with
u in order for the dependency to hold. This stronger condition more closely
resembles locality.
We remark that have not introduced special objects aset(u) for each domain
u, with the property that contents(aset(u), s) = alter(u, s), as might be
suggested by analogy with the objects oset(u). The results to follow do not
require the introduction of these objects. However, in systems with such objects,
and also satisfying the property aset(u) ∈ observe(u, s) condition DRM-5′ would
be necessarily satisfied.
Finally, condition DRM-6 relates the access control setting to the policy. Note
that if there exists an object that domain u is able to write and domain v is able
to read, then this object provides an obvious channel for information to flow
from u to v. The condition states that in this situation, the resulting channel
for information flow is permitted by the information flow policy ֌.
Theorem 5.1 SupposeM is a system with structured state that satisfies proper-
ties DRM-1 to DRM-6 with respect to policy ֌. Then M is ta♦-secure with respect
to ֌. If M also satisfies the stronger condition DRM-5′, then M is ta-secure
with respect to ֌.
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Proof: Assume that M is a system with structured state that satisfies prop-
erties DRM-1 to DRM-6 with respect to policy ֌. We first show that M satisfies
DLRM and WSC
♦
M and OCM with respect to the relations {≈u}u∈D.
For property DLRM , suppose that α |= dom(a) 6֌ u. Then by DRM-6, we have
alter(dom(a), s0 ·α)∩observe(u, s0 ·α) = ∅. Thus, for all o ∈ observe(u, s0 ·α),
we have o 6∈ alter(dom(a), s0 ·α), and by DRM-3 we obtain that contents(o, s0 ·
α) = contents(o, s0 · αa). This shows that s0 · αa ≈u s0 · α, as required.
For WSC♦M , suppose that α |= dom(a) ֌ u and β |= dom(a) ֌ u and
s0 · α ≈u s0 · β and s0 · α ≈dom(a) s0 · β. We need to show that s0 · αa ≈u
s0 · βa, i.e., that for all o ∈ observe(u, s0 · αa), we have contents(o, s0 · αa) =
contents(o, s0 · βa). Let o ∈ observe(u, s0 · αa). By DRM-4 we have that
o ∈ observe(u, s0 · α) ∪ observe(dom(a), s0 · α). From s0 · α ≈u s0 · β and
s0 · α ≈dom(a) s0 · β we obtain that observe(u, s0 · α) = observe(u, s0 · β) and
observe(dom(a), s0 ·α) = observe(dom(a), s0 ·β), and for all o ∈ observe(u, s0 ·
α) ∪ observe(dom(a), s0 · α) we have contents(o, s0 · α) = contents(o, s0 · β).
By two applications of DRM-5 (one for the pair of domains u, dom(a), and the
other for the pair dom(a) ,dom(a)), we obtain that o ∈ alter(dom(a), s0 · α) iff
o ∈ alter(dom(a), s0 · β). It therefore suffices to consider two cases:
• Suppose o ∈ alter(dom(a), s0 · α) ∩ alter(dom(a), s0 · β). Then by DRM-2
we get contents(o, s0 · αa) = contents(o, s0 · βa).
• Suppose o 6∈ alter(dom(a), s0 · α) and o 6∈ alter(dom(a), s0 · β). Then by
DRM-3 we have contents(o, s0 ·αa) = contents(o, s0 ·α) = contents(o, s0 ·
β) = contents(o, s0 · βa).
The property OCM is trivial, since this is just DRM-1. We now have that M
satisfies DLRM and WSC
♦
M and OCM . By Theorem 4.3, it follows that M is
ta♦-secure with respect to ֌.
Suppose that M also satisfies the stronger condition DRM-5′. We show that
M is ta-secure with respect to ֌. Consider the policy ֌M defined by α |=
u֌M v if alter(u, s0 · α) ∩ observe(v, s0 · α) 6= ∅. It is easily checked that M
satisfies DRM-1 to DRM-6 with respect to policy֌M , so by the above, we conclude
that M is ta♦-secure with respect to ֌M . We claim that the policy ֌M is
local. This being the case, we obtain using Theorem 3.2 that M is ta-secure
with respect to ֌M . By DRM-6, we have that ֌M ≤ ֌, so by Proposition 2
we get that M is ta-secure with respect to ֌.
To show that ֌M is local, define the equivalence relations {∼u}u∈D on A
∗
by α ∼u β iff s0 · α ≈u s0 · β. It follows from the fact that M satisfies DLRM
with respect to {≈u}u∈D that M satisfies DLR with respect to {∼u}u∈D. An
argument similar to that above for WSC♦M , but using DRM-5
′ in place of DRM-
5, shows that M also satisfies WSC with respect to {∼u}u∈D. Thus, for the
smallest equivalence relations {∼unwu }u∈D satisfyingWSC and DLR with respect
to ֌M , we have ∼unwu ⊆ ∼u for all u ∈ D. Suppose that ta
♦
u(α) = ta
♦
u (β)
and ta♦v (α) = ta
♦
v (β) (with respect to policy ֌
M ). We need to show that
α |= u֌M v iff β |= u֌M v. By Lemma 3, we have that α ∼unwu β and
α ∼unwv β. By what was shown above, we obtain that α ∼u β and α ∼v
35
β, so s0 · α ≈u s0 · β and s0 · α ≈v s0 · β. By DRM-5′ we now obtain that
observe(u, s0 · α) ∩ alter(v, s0 · α) = observe(u, s0 · β) ∩ alter(v, s0 · β). It
follows that α |= u֌M v iff β |= u֌M v, as required. 
Theorem 5.1 shows that access control mechanisms provide an implemen-
tation method that guarantees that a system constructed using this method
is secure. It states a soundness result: any system that satisfies the reference
monitor conditions with respect to a policy is secure for that policy.
It is also possible to prove a converse to this result, stating that any system
that is secure with respect to a policy could have been constructed using access
control mechanisms so as to satisfy the policy. To obtain such a result, we need
to allow consideration of a bisimilar system. In particular, we focus on the
unfolding of a system M .
Say that a system admits an access control interpretation consistent with a
policy ֌, if it can be extended into a system with structured state by adding
definitions of O, V, contents, observe and alter in such a way as to satisfy
conditions DRM-1 to DRM-6.
Theorem 5.2 Let systemM be ta♦-secure with respect to֌. Then unfold(M)
admits an access control interpretation consistent with ֌.
IfM is ta-secure with respect to֌, then there exists a local policy֌′ ≤֌
such that unfold(M) admits an access control interpretation consistent with֌′,
that additionally satisfies DRM-5′.
Proof: Suppose first thatM is ta♦-secure with respect to֌. Extend unfold(M)
to a system with structured state by the following definitions:
O = D ∪ Osets(D)
observe(u, α) = {u, oset(u)}
alter(u, α) = {v ∈ D | α |= u֌ v}
contents(x, α) =
{
ta♦x (α) if x ∈ D
{u, oset(u)} if x = oset(u)
We will show that the dynamic reference monitor conditions DRM-1 to DRM-6
hold.
DRM-1: Let α ≈u β. Then we have u ∈ observe(u, α) = observe(u, β) and
ta♦u (α) = contents(u, α) = contents(u, β) = ta
♦
u (β). It now follows by
ta♦-security ofM that obsu(α) = obs
M
u (s0 ·α) = obs
M
u (s0 ·β) = obsu(β).
DRM-2: Let o ∈ alter(dom(a), α)∩alter(dom(a), β) and α ≈dom(a) β and contents(o, α) =
contents(o, β). From α ≈dom(a) β and the fact that, by definition, dom(a) ∈
observe(dom(a), α) we obtain ta♦
dom(a)(α) = ta
♦
dom(a)(β). From o ∈ alter(dom(a), α)∩
alter(dom(a), β) it follows that o ∈ D and α |= dom(a)֌ o and β |=
dom(a)֌ o. From contents(o, α) = contents(o, β) it follows that ta♦o (α) =
ta♦o (β). By the definition of the ta
♦-operator, we obtain ta♦o (αa) =
ta♦o (βa).
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DRM-3: We prove the contrapositive. Suppose o /∈ alter(dom(a), α). We can
assume that o ∈ D, since the values of objects in Osets do not change.
Thus, we have α |= dom(a)֌ o. Then we have ta♦o (αa) = ta
♦
o (α) and
hence contents(o, αa) = contents(o, α).
DRM-4: Since the function observe is constant, we have observe(u, α · a) \
observe(u, α) = ∅.
DRM-5: By definition, we have that
observe(u, α) ∩ alter(v, α) =
{
{u} if α |= v֌ u
∅ otherwise
observe(u, β) ∩ alter(v, β) =
{
{u} if β |= v֌ u
∅ otherwise
It is immediate that if α |= v֌ u and α |= v֌ u then observe(u, α) ∩
alter(v, α) = {u} = observe(u, β)∩alter(v, β). (We remark that we do
not need the antecedents α ≈u β and α ≈v β of DRM-5, so we have actually
proved something stronger.)
DRM-6: We prove the contrapositive. Suppose α |= u 6֌ v. Then clearly alter(u, α)∩
observe(v, α) = {w ∈ D | α |= u֌ w} ∩ {v, oset(v)} = ∅.
Next, suppose that M is ta-secure with respect to ֌. By Lemma 6 there
exists a local policy ֌′ ≤ ֌ such that M is ta-secure with respect to ֌′.
By Theorem 3.2, M is ta♦-secure with respect to ֌′. Hence, we may apply
the above construction with respect to ֌′ instead of ֌, to obtain an access
control interpretation consistent with֌′. We show that the stronger condition
DRM-5′ also holds in this case. Let α ≈u β and α ≈v β. Then we have ta
♦
u (α) =
ta♦u (β) and ta
♦
v (α) = ta
♦
v (β), i.e., α ∼
♦
u β and α ∼
♦
v β. We may work with
the relations ∼♦ in the definition of locality, so from locality of ֌′, it follows
that α |= v ֌′ u iff β |= v ֌′ u. If α |= v ֌′ u and β |= v ֌′ u then
observe(u, α) ∩ alter(v, α) = {u} = observe(u, β) ∩ alter(v, β). Alternately,
if α |= v 6֌′ u and β |= v 6֌′ u then observe(u, α) ∩ alter(v, α) = ∅ =
observe(u, β)∩ alter(v, β). That is, in either case, we have the desired result.

Theorem 5.2 can be understood as saying that every system that is secure
with respect to a local policy could have been constructed using access control
mechanisms satisfying the reference monitor conditions, in such a way that its
security follows using Theorem 5.1. The phrase “could have been constructed”
here is formally interpreted as allowing bisimilar systems as equivalent alternate
implementations. Thus, this result states that the reference monitor conditions
provide both a sound and complete methodology for the construction of systems
that are secure with respect to local policies. This result, and the intuitive na-
ture of the dynamic reference monitor conditions, provides further justification
for our definitions.
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6 Example: a capability system
In the operating systems literature, capabilities are a commonly used repre-
sentation for access control. They provide a conceptual model that allows for
dynamic security policies, by allowing an agent possessing a capability to trans-
mit it to another agent, thereby granting the receiver the powers associated with
the capability. A number of works on Decentralized Information Flow Control
systems [21, 28, 35, 37] have proposed capability-based systems as a mechanism
for implementing dynamic information flow policies. Many of the proposals in
the literature contain covert channels. In this section, we develop a simplified
model that is in the spirit of these proposals, but tailored to be secure with
respect to an associated policy. (Our model was motivated by a consideration
of Flume [21], but we have taken significant liberties in order to obtain a system
that satisfies the desired result. We discuss the motivation for our changes to
Flume in Section 6.4.)
6.1 States and Observations
We assume a set P of processes, each corresponding to a domain, so D = P .
There is a fixed set N of basic tag names, from which the set T = N ∪{np | n ∈
N , p ∈ P} of tags is generated. Here, each tag t ∈ N is a tag that exists at
system startup, and np is a tag that is labelled with the process p that may
create it. A security level is represented as a subset of T . A capability is a
value of the form either t+ or t−, where t is a tag. Intuitively, t+ represents
the capability to add tag t to a security level, and t− represents the capability
to remove tag t from a security level. We write Capabilities for the set of all
capabilities.
Each process p has an associated set Objectsp = Datap ∪ PolicyStatep of
objects. The set PolicyStatep represents process p’s component of the policy,
and consists of the following special objects, each with an associated type (of
possible values for the object)
• Sp of type P(T ): the value of this object is a set of tags, and intuitively
represents the types of information that process p may receive. The set
Sp is called the secrecy set of process p, and represents its security level.
• Op of type P(Capabilities ) the value of this object is a set of capabilities.
The set Op is called the capability set of process p, and represents the set
of powers that the process has to add and remove tags from its security
level.
The set Datap is the set of data objects that are local to process p. We assume
that the set Datap contains at least the following:
• mp, an outgoing message buffer, used by p to construct a message prior
to its transmission
• inp, of type a sequence of messages. This is the input buffer through which
p receives messages from other processes.
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A state is a function s assigning a value of the appropriate type to each object
in
⋃
p∈P Objectsp. We write S for the set of states. A candidate initial state is a
state s such that for all processes p, we have Op ⊆ {nx | n ∈ N , x ∈ {+,−}} and
Sp ⊆ N . That is, in an initial state, only basic tags exist; tags local to a process
need to be created as the system runs. We allow the initial state of a system
to be any candidate initial state: different choices of initial state correspond to
different initial configurations of the security policy.
The observation functions of a capability system may be defined as any
functions that satisfy the following constraint, for each process p and all states
s and t:
Obs. If s ↾ Objectsp = t ↾ Objectsp then obsp(s) = obsp(t).
That is, observations depend, for each process, only on its own objects.
Given the intuition that the set Sp represents the types of information that
process p may receive. Note that if Sp contains a tag t then p may have received
information of type t. If t is not in Sq for some other process q, then there is a
risk that if p transfers information to q then q will obtain information of type
t, which is prohibited. This suggests that with each state s, we may naturally
associate a static policy֌, such that p֌ q iff Sp(s) ⊆ Sq(s). In what follows,
it is convenient to write s |= Sp ⊆ Sq when s(Sp) ⊆ s(Sq).
6.2 Actions and Transitions
The following actions are possible in the system. We write actions in the for-
mat p.a, where p ∈ P is a process, and define the domain of action p.a to be
dom(p.a) = p.
Data actions p.a
We assume that p has some set of data manipulating actions that act on
its data objects. This set of actions can be instantiated in any way, subject
to the constraint that these actions read only the local state of the process
and write only the data objects of the process. More precisely, for any
data action p.a, we assume the following, for all states s and t:
Data1. For all objects x 6∈ Datap, (s · p.a)(x) = s(x).
Data2. If s(x) = t(x) for all x ∈ Objectsp, then (s · p.a)(x) = (t · p.a)(x)
for all x ∈ Datap.
Constraint Data1 says that data actions of process p change only p’s data
objects, and no others. Constraint Data2 says that the way that such an
action changes p’s data objects depends only on the value of p’s data and
policy state objects. That is, a data action p.a is deterministic and may
read only objects in Objectsp and write only objects in Datap.
p.add cap(c, n) where n ∈ N and c ⊆ {+,−} with code
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Op := Op ∪ {nxp | x ∈ c}
Intuitively, this action creates a new tag np, if it does not already exist,
and grants p the rights c over this tag, by adding the capabilities nxp for
x ∈ c to p’s capability set Op. (If the tag already exists, the operation
may be used to add capabilities to the existing ones.) Note that the fact
that the tag created is indexed by the process p means that two distinct
processes cannot create a tag with the same name.
p.drop cap(c) where c ∈ Capabilities , with code
Op := Op \ {c}
This action removes the capability c from p′s capability set, if present.
p.add tag(t) where t ∈ T , with code
If t+ ∈ Op then Sp := Sp ∪ {t}
This action adds a tag to the secrecy set of the process, provided it has
the capability to do so. A consequence of this is that some outgoing edges
from p may be removed from the policy, and some ingoing edges may be
added.
p.remove tag(t) where t ∈ T , with code
If t− ∈ Op then Sp := Sp \ {t}
This action removes a tag from the secrecy set of the process, provided it
has the capability to do so, and consequently might add outgoing policy
edges from p or insert incoming edges. Intuitively, by removing the tag, p
enables declassification of information of type p; whereas it may have re-
ceived information of type t, the policy is no longer constrained to restrict
p from communicating with processes that are not permitted to receive
information of type t.
p.send message to(q) where q is a process, with code
If Sp ⊆ Sq then inq := inq ·mp
This action transmits the message in the message objectmp to q by adding
it to the end of q′s input buffer inp, provided the policy permits transmis-
sion of information from p to q (i.e., Sp ⊆ Sq). The action has no effect on
the policy, even if the message contains information about p’s tags and/or
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capabilities. Intuitively, we assume that the operating system is responsi-
ble for maintaining the policy state, and mere knowledge of a capability
name or value does not suffice to be able to exercise the capability. In
order to transmit the ability to exercise capabilities, the following action
needs to be used.
p.send cap(c, q) where c ∈ Capabilities and q is a process, with code
If Sp ⊆ Sq and c ∈ Op then Oq := Oq ∪ {c} .
This action transmits the capability c to q, provided both that p is permit-
ted to transmit information to q (i.e., Sp ⊆ Sq) and p actually possesses
the capability (i.e., c ∈ Op). The effect of this action may be to remove
outgoing edges from q or add incoming edges to q.
6.3 Security of the capability model
We now establish the security of any capability system constructed as described
above. Note that there are multiple such systems, since the description above
leaves open the choice of processes, basic tag names, data objects, data actions,
initial state and observation functions. It also remains to specify a dynamic
security policy. Given a capability system M with actions A and processes P ,
and initial state s0, we say that the associated policy is the policy ֌
M defined
by α |= p֌M q when s0 · α |= Sp ⊆ Sq. The following states that a capability
system is secure with respect to the the associated security policy.
Theorem 6.1 Let M be a capability system. Then the associated policy ֌M is
local, and the system M is both ta♦-secure and ta-secure with respect to ֌M .
Proof: We show thatM admits an access control interpretation consistent with
֌M and apply Theorem 5.1.
For the set of objects of the access control interpretation, we take O =
∪p∈PObjectsp ∪ {oset(p)}. (Since both the access control model and the ca-
pability model use a notion of object, and these are not quite the same when
relating the two models, the reader needs to bear in mind that O refers to
the objects in the acccess control model and Objects refers to objects in the
capability model.) We define the access control functions for states s and pro-
cesses p by observe(p, s) = Objectsp ∪ {oset(p)} and alter(p, s) = Objectsp ∪
{inq, Oq | s |= Sp ⊆ Sq}. For each state s and object o ∈ ∪p∈PObjectsp, we
define contents(o, s) = s(o), and (as is necessary) for o = oset(p), we define
contents(o, s) = observe(s, p). We need to show that conditions DRM-1 to
DRM-4, DRM-5’ and DRM-6 are satisfied by these definitions.
Note that, by definition of ≈p, and the definitions above, we have s ≈p t iff
for all o ∈ Objectsp we have s(o) = t(o) (the contents of oset(p) are static).
Additionally, o ∈ alter(p, s) ∩ observe(q, s) iff p = q and o ∈ Objectsp or
p 6= q and s |= Sp ⊆ Sq and o ∈ {inq, Oq}.
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DRM-1: This is immediate from the above characterization of ≈p and the con-
straint Obs.
DRM-2: Suppose o ∈ alter(dom(a), s) ∩ alter(dom(a), t) and s ≈dom(a) t and
contents(o, s) = contents(o, t). We need to show that contents(o, s ·
a) = contents(o, t · a). By definition, we have o ∈ alter(dom(a), s) ∩
alter(dom(a), t) just when either o ∈ Objects
dom(a) or o ∈ {inq, Oq} for
some process q such that s |= Sdom(a) ⊆ Sq. From s ≈dom(a) t we have that
s ↾ dom(a) = t ↾ dom(a), and from contents(o, s) = contents(o, t) we
have s(o) = t(o).
We argue that contents(o, s · a) = contents(o, t · a), i.e., (s · a)(o) =
(t · a)(o), for each possibility for the action a.
• If a is a data action p.b (so that p = dom(a)), then if o /∈ Datadom(a),
we have by Data1 that (s ·a)(o) = s(o) = t(o) = (t ·a)(o). In the case
o /∈ Datadom(a), we have o ∈ Objectsdom(a), and (s · a)(o) = (t · a)(o)
follows by Data2.
• The code for each of the actions p.add cap(c, n), p.drop cap(c), p.add tag(t),
p.remove tag(t), reads only objects in Objectsp and writes only ob-
jects in Objectsp. If a is one of these actions, then p = dom(a) and
the claim holds.
• The only object that can be changed by the code for the action
a = p.send message to(q) is inq, so this is the only case of o that we
need to consider. If dom(a) = p = q, then the condition Sp |= Sq
is a tautology, so the code performs the assignment inp := inp ·mp
in both states s and t. If dom(a) = p 6= q, then from o = inq ∈
alter(dom(a), s) ∩ alter(dom(a), t) we have both s |= Sp ⊆ Sq and
t |= Sp ⊆ Sq. Thus, again, the code takes the same branch in both
cases, and since mp ∈ Objectsp we have s(mp) = t(mp) and we have
(s ·a)(inq) = s(inq) ·s(mp) = t(inq) · t(mp) = (t ·a)(inq), as required.
The argument for the action p.send cap(c, q) is similar.
DRM-3: Suppose that o /∈ alter(dom(a), s). Since Objects
dom(a) ⊆ alter(dom(a), s),
we have o /∈ Objects
dom(a). It follows that data actions a and actions a
of the forms p.add cap(c, n), p.drop cap(c), p.add tag(t), p.remove tag(t)
do not change the value of o, since these actions change only the values
of objects in Objects
dom(a). In the case of a = p.send message to(q) and
p.send cap(c, q), we have from o /∈ alter(dom(a), s) that o is not one of the
two possible objects inq and Oq whose values these actions can change, so
again, these actions do not change the value of o.
DRM-4: This is immediate from the fact that the value of observe(s, p) is a
constant.
DRM-5′: Suppose s ≈p t and s ≈q t. We need to show that alter(p, s) ∩
observe(q, s) = alter(p, t) ∩ observe(q, t). Now observe(q, s) is a con-
stant, and if p = q then alter(p, s) = Objectsp is also a constant, so we
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need only consider the case p 6= q. In this case, alter(p, s)∩observe(q, s)
is {inq, Oq} if s |= Sp ⊆ Sq and is ∅ otherwise. From s ≈p t and s ≈q t we
get that s(Sp) = t(Sp) and s(Sq) = t(Sq), so s |= Sp ⊆ Sq iff t |= Sp ⊆ Sq.
Thus, alter(p, s) ∩ observe(q, s) = alter(p, t) ∩ observe(q, t).
DRM-6: Note that for p 6= q, the sets Objectsp and Objectsq are disjoint. It
follows that if alter(p, s0 ·α)∩observe(q, s0 ·α) 6= ∅, then we have either
p = q or s0 · α |= Sp ⊆ Sq. In either case, we have s0 · α |= Sp ⊆ Sq, i.e.,
α |= p֌M q. 
It follows from Theorem 6.1 that a capability system is secure with respect
to any policy that is no more restrictive than the associated policy.
Corollary 1 Let M be a capability system. Then for any dynamic security
policy ֌ with ֌M ≤֌, the system M is both ta♦-secure and ta-secure with
respect to ֌.
Proof: Immediate from Theorem 6.1 using Proposition 2 and Proposition 3. 
6.4 Comments on Flume
The capability system described above is somewhat motivated by Flume [21],
but differs in a number of respects. We comment here on the differences.
First, Flume associates both a secrecy set Sp ⊆ T and an integrity set Ip ⊆ T
to each agent p. These operate dually, so we have avoided inclusion of the
integrity set just for simplicity. Our formulation could be extended to include
it.
Next, Flume permits transmission of information from p to q when Sp \
Dp ⊆ Sq ∪ Dq, where Du is the set of tags for which u possesses both the
capability to add and remove the tag. The intuition for this definition is that if
p wishes to transmit information to q, but is constrained from doing so because
Sp contains a tag t that are not in Sq, then this obstacle would be overcome
if p is able to remove the tag from Sp or if q is able to add the tag to Sq.
Assuming no other obstacles, the transmission could then proceed. Moreover,
if, correspondingly, p is also able to add the tag or q is able to remove it, then
after the transmission, the policy could be restored to its original state. Thus,
the condition Sp \ Dp ⊆ Sq ∪ Dq captures the situations where this sequence
of moves would allow transmission from p to q while leaving the policy state
unchanged after the transmission is complete. The thinking then is that since
such a sequence of moves cannot be prevented, the policy may as well allow the
transmission directly.
We are not convinced that this is a good idea. One reason for p to have a tag
in Dp but not in Sp might be that p wishes to protect itself against inadvertent
transmission of information to q. Mechanisms such as sudo and the discretionary
access controls on a user’s own objects in Unix are explicitly designed to disable
the effects of actions that the user nevertheless has the capacity to enable, and
it seems useful to have a similar discretionary layer of control for information
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flow policies. So we have not followed Flume in adopting this modification of
the basic policy.
The Flume model includes a set Oˆ of global capabilities, that are implicitly
owned by all domains. That is, Flume works with the sets of owned capabilities
Op = Op ∪ Oˆ. When creating a tag, an agent is able to place the associated
capabilities into Oˆ. The motivation for this appears to be the following ([21]
section II.D):
The most important policy in Flume is export protection, wherein
untrustworthy processes can compute with secret data without the
ability to reveal it. An export protection tag is a tag t such that
t+ ∈ Oˆ and t− ∈ Oˆ. For a process p to achieve such a result, it
creates a new tag t and grants t+ to the global set Oˆ, while closely
guarding t−. To protect a file f , p creates the file with secrecy label
{t}. If a process q wishes to read f , it must first add t to Sq, which
it can do since t+ ∈ Oˆ ⊆ Oq. Now, q can only send messages to
other processes with t in their labels. It requires p’s authorization
to remove t from its label or send data to the network.
We have not followed Flume in including the set of global capabilities O.
One reason is that we find the above argument unconvincing. Once t+ is in Oˆ,
not just q, but any other agent r may add t to its secrecy set, and any protection
afforded by tag t is then eliminated. The main reason that Krohn and Tromer
have in mind that r might not be able to add t to its secrecy set is that t is
randomly generated, and r does not know the appropriate value to use, making
it a low probability event that r should add t unless it somehow receives t+ in
a chain of transmission from p. But in that case, we may as well rely upon
the direct transmission of t+ to the set Or as the enabler for r’s adding t to its
secrecy set. There does not appear to be any necessary role for Oˆ in the above
argument.
Another reason for not following Flume in the inclusion of the global set Oˆ
is that it causes a covert channel. An agent p may choose to add a capability
t to O, and any other agent q can test whether the capability t is in O or not.
This causes a flow of information from p to q. Krohn and Tromer are aware of
this covert channel and seek to mitigate it by randomizing tag names. However
this means that they require a much more complicated probabilistic version
of noninterference semantics. It is not clear to us whether their semantics is
well-formulated, since some subtle points appear to have been overlooked. Note
that their systems have both probabilistic transitions (random generation of tag
names) and nondeterministic transitions (agent’s choice of their actions). This
means that there is not a straightforward probability distribution on runs. How
to handle the mix of probability and nondeterminism is an issue that has been
studied in the literature, and involves a number of subtleties [18, 7]. It does
not appear that Krohn and Tromer are aware of these issues, indeed, they do
not even define the probability space that they use. It would seem that, at the
very least, some non-trivial further details are needed to make their result fully
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precise, which we will not pursue here.
Finally, Flume allows for dynamic creation of processes by means of a forking
operation. It uses this to represent newly created objects as processes. Our
policy model assumes a fixed set of domains, so this aspect of Flume cannot
be directly represented. It would be interesting to develop an extension of our
framework with the expressiveness to encompass creation of objects and agents.
7 Related Work
Related work using an automaton-based semantics similar to the one we have
used in the paper has already been discussed in detail in Section 3.5. We focus
here on work in the context of programming language security that has consid-
ered dynamic information flow policies. A recent survey of dynamic policies in
the context of programming languages is [5]. They attempt to develop a clas-
sification based on various “facets” that are factored into the wide spectrum of
definitions of security in this area. In general, there exist nontrivial gaps be-
tween the semantic frameworks used in this literature and our semantic model.
Even within the programming language literature, formal relationships between
the various semantics studied are rarely presented. We therefore give only some
informal comparisons with our work.
One of the facets discussed in [5] is the distinction between “whitelisting
flows” and “blacklisting flows”, which is similar to our distinction between a
permissive and a prohibitive reading of policies. Interestingly, the whitelist-
ing/permissive reading is claimed to be the norm in the programming language
security literature.
However, there are also significant points of difference. Generally these works
concern a programming language framework in which the secrets to be concealed
are already encoded into the initial state, rather than our “interactive” model in
which secrets are generated on the fly as the result of nondeterministic choices
of action made by the agents. Frequently, the programming languages studied
are deterministic, so a direct relationship to our setting is not immediately clear.
There exists an approach by Clarke and Hunt [9] to handling interactivity in a
programming language setting by including stream variables in the initial state
to represent the sequence of future inputs that will be selected by an agent over
the course of the run. However, this, in effect, assumes that the scheduler also
is deterministic. Adding a variable for the schedule and allowing other agents to
learn the complete schedule would be more permissive than a definition such as
TA-security, since this restricts the information that agents may learn about the
schedule. It therefore seems that establishing an exact correspondence would
require some detailed work.
Another significant point of difference is that in the programming language
literature, the policy and the system model (program) are often tightly inter-
twined, whereas we have a separate policy and system model, just as a specifi-
cation and implementation are usually considered distinct. Other works that do
allow for such a separation include Morgan [26] develops a refinement calculus
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that allows for mixtures of information flow specifications and code, enabling an
implementation to be derived from a specification via steps that mix the two,
and Delft et. al. [33], who develop a type theory for dynamic information flow
that operates on a program separately from the dynamic policy.
One of the ways that intransitivity is handled in the programming language
setting also involves a dynamic aspect to policies: special constructs are intro-
duced that allow temporary violations of a static policy, either through use of
special basic actions or the establishment of a program region within which an
alternate policy is enforced. For example, Mantel and Sands [23] work with a
classical transitive security policy, but add downgrading commands that may
violate this policy (subject to some alternate constraints.) They give a security
definition that uses a specially defined bisimulation relation.
Broberg and Sands [3, 4] define flow locks, which enable variables to be typed
with conditional annotations that constrain the security levels to which contents
of these variables may flow. The values referred to in the conditions may be
altered during the execution of the program, thereby making the policy dynamic.
The authors give a complex bisimulation-based semantics to these policies [3],
but in later work [4] prefer an alternate knowledge-based semantics, with a
perfect recall interpretation of knowledge. It appears that their definitions are
closer to those for a classical purge-based definition than to our intransitive
policies. To capture a downgrader policy H ֌ D ֌ L, such as to allow
information from H to reach L via D, it seems necessary to temporarily change
the policy to effectively add an edge H ֌ L to the policy, allowing a direct
flow from H to L. This is not in the spirit of intransitive noninterference, which
intends to capture that all flows from H to L must pass through D.
Chong and Myers [8] propose to handle declassification violations of transi-
tive policy using a notion of noninterference until declassification which applies a
classical noninterference definition on runs just up to the point where a sequence
of events has occurred on the basis of which the policy permits a declassification
of secret information to the domain under consideration. Beyond this point, the
definition does not constrain the behaviour of the system. Hicks et al [20] refine
this idea to impose constraints on longer runs, declaring these secure if they
consist of a sequence of policy-update free fragments, each of which satisfies the
standard noninterference condition. This extension is also applied in Swamy
et al [32], who develop a language with dynamic role-based information flow
policies. This approach is also similar to the approach used by Almeida-Matos
and Boudol [25], who work in a language-based setting where a transitive policy
can temporarily be extended by addition of new edges (yielding another tran-
sitive policy). Their security condition states, using a bisimulation, that each
transition in an execution is secure with respect to the transitive policy in place
at the time the transition is taken. We note that these approaches generally
do not handle covert channels resulting from the policy changes themselves, as
illustrated in our Example 1.
All of the above approaches, like ours in this paper, work with perfect recall
definitions of attacker knowledge. Askarov and Chong [1] point to an interesting
issue with respect to dynamic security policies, which is that events may trans-
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mit “old news”: information that would have been allowed to be transmitted to
an attacker according to an earlier state of the security policy, but was actually
not transmitted. The current state of the policy may prohibit the flow of this
information. In this case, security definitions that are based on a perfect recall
model of attacker knowledge, fail to identify such transmissions of “old news”
as violations of security.
In response to this observation, Askarov and Chong propose to work with
attackers that are weaker than the perfect recall attacker. They define a notion
of knowledge for such attackers, and state definitions of security that require
that any new knowledge gained by an attacker at security level (domain) u
should only concern security levels v such that v֌ u according to the security
policy at the time of the event. They identify some potential weaker attackers,
but do not identify a definitive set of attackers; since the attacker is a parameter
of their proposed security definition one could view the set of attackers against
which a system should be secure as a matter of policy.
One of the attackers considered by Askarov and Chong is the perfect re-
call attacker, and here it is reasonable to attempt to compare their framework
to ours. Unfortunately, making such a comparison formally is not completely
straightforward because their semantic setting is somewhat different from ours:
whereas in our framework there are multiple causal agents (the domains), who
are free to choose any action at any time, in theirs there is a single causal agent
(a deterministic program) that reads and writes information from different se-
curity domains. However, there is one respect where a clear difference of intent
is apparent in their intuitions and definitions.
Consider a situation with domains D = {A,B,C, P}. Let ∆ be the policy
{u֌ u | u ∈ D}∪{P ֌ u | u ∈ D}. Intuitively, P here is the policy authority,
and ∆ states that all domains are permitted to know the state of the policy.
In the initial state of the system, take the policy to be ∆ ∪ {A ֌ B}. Any
actions performed by A are, intuitively, permitted by this policy to be recorded
in the state of B, but should remain unknown to C. Suppose that after some
actions by A, the policy agent changes the policy to ∆ ∪ {B ֌ C}. Now, B
is permitted to communicate with C. According to our intuitions and formal
definitions, B may now send to C the information it has about the actions that
A performed before the policy change. Such flows from A to C via B are typical
of the flows that intransitive policies are intended to permit [17].
However, according to Askarov and Chong’s definitions (both for the perfect
recall attacker and weaker attackers), if an action now copies this information
from B’s state and it is observed by C, this is a violation of security, because
in a transition where it makes the observation, C learns new information about
A, whereas the current state of the policy prohibits it from doing so. Thus,
although Askarov and Chong permit intransitive policies, we would argue that
their definitions do not handle dynamic intransitivity in a way that fits our
intuitions: their semantics can best be characterized as a dynamic version of
the classical purge-based definition of security, rather than a dynamic version of
a semantics for intransitive noninterference. The details of Askarov and Chong’s
semantics are refined in [33], but similar remarks apply to to this work.
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8 Conclusion
We have developed two generalizations for intransitive dynamic policies of the
notion of TA-security that has recently been argued to provide a better seman-
tics for static policies. One is based on a permissive reading of policy edges, the
other on a prohibitive reading of policy edges. Under the natural condition of
locality, the two readings are equivalent. We have also provided proof theory
for these notions in the form of unwinding conditions and a sound and complete
policy enforcement method using access control. Finally, we have demonstrated
the applicability of the theory by applying it to establish security for a natural
capability model.
Several interesting directions remain open for further investigation. One
concerns the circularity in the justification of ta-security. While ta-security
is, as we have shown, self-consistent, there may be further natural constraints
that also lead to self-consistent notions of security. For example, one candidate
is to require for information transfer that the sender know that there is an edge
from it to the receiver, in place of the assumption we made in ta-security that
the sender and receiver must jointly know that there is such an edge. Whether
such a constraint should apply is arguably a matter of policy. This suggests that
there may be a case for a policy language that more explicitly provides a way to
express conditions on agent knowledge. It would also be of interest to develop
algorithms for verifying whether a system satisfies a policy. Both models and
dynamic policies as we have defined them are highly expressive, so this would
require some restrictions: finite state models and policies that are representable
using finite state automata would be one interesting starting point: it remains
to be shown that this case is decidable.
We have shown that while ta♦-security is more expressive than ta-security,
the difference between these notions applies only in the case of non-local poli-
cies. Both are associated with natural intuitions, but we leave open the question
of whether the extra expressiveness of ta♦-security is necessary in practice, i.e.,
whether there are any interesting systems requiring non-local policies where
ta♦-security, rather than ta-security, is the appropriate notion of security.
The main realistic example we have presented, the capability system of Sec-
tion 6 involves a local policy, so it does not resolve this question. The notion
of ta♦-security allows information flows relating to policy settings that are not
explicitly represented as edges in the policy itself. Conceivably, a richer policy
format may allow these implicit flows to be more explicitly represented.
It would also be interesting to formally relate our work to work in the
programming language setting, and to combine the insights from Askarov and
Chong’s work on imperfect recall attackers with the approach we have developed
in the present paper.
48
References
[1] A. Askarov and S. Chong. Learning is change in knowledge: Knowledge-
based security for dynamic policies. In S. Chong, editor, CSF, pages 308–
322. IEEE, 2012.
[2] C. Boettcher, R. DeLong, J. Rushby, and W. Sifre. The MILS compo-
nent integration approach to secure information sharing. In Proc. 27th
IEEE/AIAA Digital Avionics Systems Conference, pages 1.C.2–1–1.C.2–
14, Oct. 2008.
[3] N. Broberg and D. Sands. Flow locks: Towards a core calculus for dynamic
flow policies. In P. Sestoft, editor, ESOP, volume 3924 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 180–196. Springer, 2006.
[4] N. Broberg and D. Sands. Flow-sensitive semantics for dynamic information
flow policies. In PLAS, pages 101–112, 2009.
[5] N. Broberg, B. van Delft, and D. Sands. The anatomy and facets of dynamic
policies. In IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF
2015, Verona, Italy, 13-17 July, 2015, pages 122–136, 2015.
[6] D. Bytschkow, J. Quilbeuf, G. Igna, and H. Ruess. Distributed MILS
architectural approach for secure smart grids. In Smart Grid Security -
Second International Workshop, SmartGridSec 2014, Munich, Germany,
February 26, 2014, Revised Selected Papers, pages 16–29, 2014.
[7] L. Cheung. Reconciling Nondetermistic and Probabilistic Choices. PhD
thesis, IPA, Radboud University, Nijmegen, 2006.
[8] S. Chong and A. C. Myers. Security policies for downgrading. In Pro-
ceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, CCS 2004, Washington, DC, USA, October 25-29, 2004, pages
198–209, 2004.
[9] D. Clark and S. Hunt. Non-interference for deterministic interactive pro-
grams. In Formal Aspects in Security and Trust, 5th International Work-
shop, FAST 2008, Malaga, Spain, October 9-10, 2008, Revised Selected
Papers, pages 50–66, 2008.
[10] E. S. Cohen. Information transmission in computational systems. In SOSP,
pages 133–139, 1977.
[11] S. Eggert, H. Schnoor, and T. Wilke. Noninterference with local policies.
In K. Chatterjee and J. Sgall, editors, MFCS, volume 8087 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 337–348. Springer, 2013.
[12] S. Eggert, R. van der Meyden, H. Schnoor, and T. Wilke. Complexity and
unwinding for intransitive noninterference. CoRR, abs/1308.1204, 2013.
49
[13] K. Engelhardt, R. van der Meyden, and C. Zhang. Intransitive noninterfer-
ence in nondeterministic systems. In ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, pages 869–880, 2012.
[14] R. Fagin, J. Y. Halpern, Y. Moses, and M. Y. Vardi. Reasoning About
Knowledge. MIT-Press, 1995.
[15] J. A. Goguen and J. Meseguer. Security policies and security models. In
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 11–20, 1982.
[16] J. A. Goguen and J. Meseguer. Unwinding and inference control. In IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, 1984.
[17] J. T. Haigh and W. D. Young. Extending the noninterference version of
MLS for SAT. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, SE-13(2):141–
150, Feb 1987.
[18] J. He, K. Seidel, and A. McIver. Probabilistic models for the guarded
command language. Sci. Comput. Program., 28(2-3):171–192, 1997.
[19] C. L. Heitmeyer, M. Archer, E. I. Leonard, and J. D. McLean. Formal
specification and verification of data separation in a separation kernel for
an embedded system. In Proc. of the 13th ACM Conf. on Computer and
Communications Security, CCS, pages 346–355, 2006.
[20] M. Hicks, S. Tse, B. Hicks, and S. Zdancewic. Dynamic updating of
information-flow policies. In Proc. of Foundations of Computer Security
Workshop (FCS), 2005.
[21] M. Krohn and E. Tromer. Noninterference for a practical DIFC-based
operating system. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages
61–76, 2009.
[22] R. Leslie. Dynamic intransitive noninterference. In Proc. IEEE Interna-
tional Symposium on Secure Software Engineering, 2006.
[23] H. Mantel and D. Sands. Controlled declassification based on intransitive
noninterference. In Proc. Asian Symp. on Programming Languages and
Systems, volume 3302 of LNCS, pages 129–145. Springer-Verlag, Nov. 2004.
[24] W. Martin, P. White, F. Taylor, and A. Goldberg. Formal construction of
the mathematically analyzed separation kernel. In I. C. S. Press, editor,
Proc. 15th IEEE Conf. on Automated Software Engineering, 2000.
[25] A. A. Matos and G. Boudol. On declassification and the non-disclosure
policy. Journal of Computer Security, 17(5):549–597, 2009.
[26] C. Morgan. The shadow knows: Refinement and security in sequential
programs. Sci. Comput. Program., 74(8):629–653, 2009.
50
[27] T. Murray, D. Matichuk, M. Brassil, P. Gammie, and G. Klein. Nonin-
terference for operating system kernels. In C. Hawblitzel and D. Miller,
editors, Certified Programs and Proofs, volume 7679 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 126–142. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.
[28] A. C. Myers and B. Liskov. A decentralized model for information flow
control. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Symposium on Operating
Systems Principles, SOSP ’97, pages 129–142, New York, NY, USA, 1997.
ACM.
[29] A. W. Roscoe and M. H. Goldsmith. What is intransitive noninterference?
In IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 228–238, 1999.
[30] J. Rushby. Noninterference, transitivity, and channel-control security poli-
cies. Technical Report CSL-92-02, SRI International, 1992.
[31] G. Schellhorn, W. Reif, A. Schairer, P. A. Karger, V. Austel, and D. C. Toll.
Verified formal security models for multiapplicative smart cards. Journal
of Computer Security, 10(4):339–368, 2002.
[32] N. Swamy, M. Hicks, S. Tse, and S. Zdancewic. Managing policy updates
in security-typed languages. In 19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations
Workshop, (CSFW-19 2006), 5-7 July 2006, Venice, Italy, pages 202–216,
2006.
[33] B. van Delft, S. Hunt, and D. Sands. Very static enforcement of dynamic
policies. In Proc. Principles of Security and Trust - 4th Int. Conf., POST,
pages 32–52, 2015.
[34] R. van der Meyden. What, indeed, is intransitive noninterference?1. Jour-
nal of Computer Security, 23(2):197–228, 2015. An earlier version of this
work appeared in ESORICS’07.
[35] S. Vandebogart, P. Efstathopoulos, E. Kohler, M. Krohn, C. Frey,
D. Ziegler, F. Kaashoek, R. Morris, and D. Mazie`res. Labels and event
processes in the Asbestos operating system. ACM Trans. Comput. Syst.,
25(4), Dec. 2007.
[36] W. Vanfleet, R. Beckworth, B. Calloni, J. Luke, C. Taylor, and G. Uchenick.
MILS:architecture for high assurance embedded computing. Crosstalk: The
Journal of Defence Engineering, 2005.
[37] N. Zeldovich, S. Boyd-Wickizer, E. Kohler, and D. Mazie`res. Making in-
formation flow explicit in HiStar. In 7th Symposium on Operating Systems
Design and Implementation (OSDI ’06), November 6-8, Seattle, WA, USA,
pages 263–278, 2006.
51
